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INTRODUCTION

When an American party sues another American party in a federal court, at least one
thing is certain: so long as some court in the United States has jurisdiction (personal
and subject matter) over the case, the case will be heard here. By contrast, when
foreign parties are involved in litigation in a federal court, whether as plaintiffs,
defendants, or both, there is no such guarantee, even where the federal court is properly
seised of jurisdiction (personal and subject matter). While this result may at first
appear intuitively obvious, the impact of this result on litigation in the United Statesand the resulting policy making role of courts in this process-raises substantial
concerns.' If a court is properly seised of jurisdiction, why should the parties'
nationality matter? And, if it does matter, why should the courts be making decisions

* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A., 1994, Princeton
University; J.D., M.A., 1999, University of Michigan. For advice and comments on this Article,
many thanks to Jim Klebba, John Lopatka, Mathias Reimann, Andy Siegel, Patrick Woolley,
and all of my civil procedure colleagues at the University of South Carolina. Above all, thanks
to an outstanding group of research assistants over two years in collecting and reviewing cases
for the data set, including Bruce Hoover, Robert McWilliams, Karen Miller, and John Zimmer.
Any shortcomings are the responsibility of the author alone.
1. Indeed, it has been noted that "[t]he battle over where the litigation occurs is typically
the hardest fought and most important issue in a transnational case." David W. Robertson &
Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in TransnationalPersonalInjury Cases: Forum Non
Conveniens andAntisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 938 (1990).
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on this issue when Congress has demonstrated its capacity and willingness to legislate
in this arena? More narrowly, if a foreign plaintiff sues an American defendant in the
district where the defendant resides, should there not be a presumption that the case
should be heard there? 2 These questions lie at the center of this Article, which explores
the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal courts since the landmark
Supreme Court decision in PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno 3 that set forth the modem-day
test for forum non conveniens analysis in federal courts.
Forum non conveniens says that an appropriate forum-even though competent
under the law-may divest itself ofjurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants,
the witnesses, or the public, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum
where the action might originally have been brought.4
When applied properly, forum non conveniens can be useful in ensuring that private
and public resources are efficiently managed in the context of litigation involving
foreign parties on one or both sides of a case. However, the present test for forum non
conveniens-as set forth by the Supreme Court in Piperand as interpreted by lower
courts-creates confusion and uncertainty in application. That confusion, which results
from an unclear test that is unevenly enforced, undermines the legitimacy and
accountability of the federal courts. Indeed, as Kevin Clermont has noted in reference
to Piper,"[n]o procedural doctrine is so encapsulated in a single opinion that is so illconceived." 5
The current doctrine calls on courts to conduct a two-part inquiry to determine
whether a case should be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens. 6 First, courts
should determine whether an available alternative forum (AAF) exists for the action.7
This test asks whether a court can dismiss the lawsuit in favor of another forum. 8 If

2. For well-reasoned thoughts on this point, see Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal
Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier ofthe Inherent Power, 91 IOWA
L. REv. 1147, 1164 (2006) (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)),
which argues that while Congress in its 1988 and 1990 revisions to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 retained a
venue preference for lawsuits where defendants reside, the federal judiciary has failed to follow
Congress's lead, going so far as to refer to the forum non conveniens doctrine as a "supervening
venue provision."
3. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
4. Spiliada Mar. Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] 1 A.C. 460 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.) ("The basic principle is that... forum non conveniens [will be invoked] where the
court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which
is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more
suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.").
5. Kevin M. Clermont, The Story of Piper:Fracturingthe Foundation ofForum Non
Conveniens, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 193, 195 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
6. See Piper,454 U.S. 235; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting

that application of the doctrine "presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process"), supersededby statute, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)).
7. Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
8. For purposes of this Article, the test shall be referred to exclusively as a test for an
AAF. Courts and scholars variably describe this test as a test for an AAF, an adequate available
forum, or an available alternate forum. For cases using the language of an "available alternative
forum," see, for example, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 189 (2d Cir. 2009); Barakv.
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such a forum exists, then courts should weigh a variety of private and public interest
factors to determine whether the case should be dismissed. In essence, then, the first
prong offers no discretion to trial courts, whereas the second prong calls on the trial
court to exercise discretion. Despite the Supreme Court's efforts in Piperto craft one,
no single coherent test exists for forum non conveniens.
This Article draws on a review of every published federal court decision since 1982
that has considered the doctrine of forum non conveniens to understand how courts are
applying the doctrine (nearly 1500 decisions in all).9 As the data collected herein
reveals, far too often courts conflate the two prongs-treating both as discretionary,
bypassing the first prong altogether, or considering AAF without meaningful review
and analysis. Lower courts struggle to apply the two-part Piperinquiry.10 However, by
its very nature, that second prong is ad hoc and not susceptible to closer scrutiny. This
capricious process is unfair to plaintiffs and defendants alike and undermines the
authority of the judiciary-at least when ruling on forum non conveniens motions. This
Article thus proposes a new framework for properly and effectively resolving forum
non conveniens cases, focusing on the first prong of the two-prong analysis:
establishing whether an AAF exists for the case.
The analysis of an AAF should be centered on the basic but simple question: is
forum two (F2) truly available to the plaintiff(s) in this case for this (or these) cause(s)
of action? The six-factor AAF test proposed here aims to create a checklist for courts
to use in answering that basic question.
The factors courts should consider are (1) whether all defendants are subject to the
jurisdiction of F2 according to the law of F2; (2) whether F2 provides a meaningful
remedy; (3) whether the plaintiff will be treated fairly in F2; (4) whether all plaintiffs
have practical access to the courts of F2; (5) whether F2 provides procedural due
process; and (6) whether F2 is a stable forum.
While the six-factor test adds a level of serious review to the first prong of the
forum non conveniens inquiry, that review is indispensible to ensuring that forum non
conveniens is not misused by federal courts. Also, to reduce the burden on courts, this
Zeff, 289 F. App'x 907, 916 (6th Cir. 2008); Tyco Fire& Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x
860, 865 (11th Cir. 2007). For cases using "adequate available forum," see, for example,
Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 2008); Baumgart v. FairchildAircraft

Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 835 (Sth Cir. 1993); Mercierv. SheratonInt'l,Inc., 981 F.2d 1345,134850 (1st Cir. 1992). For cases using "available alternate forum," see, for example, Dickson
Marine Inc. v. Panalpina,Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 342 (5th Cir. 1999); Gschwindv. CessnaAircraft
Co., 161 F.3d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1998); DFRPLLC v. Republica BolivarianaDe Venez, No.

2:04-cv-793, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11850, at *41 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2009).
9. The data review starts with 1982 to capture all forum non conveniens cases that have
been decided since the Supreme Court decided Piperin December 1981. A subsequent article,
titled An Empirical Analysis of Forum Non Conveniens Cases in the Federal Courts Since
Piper, will explore the data more comprehensively in search of broader lessons to be gleaned
from the treatment of forum non conveniens motions by federal courts since 1982.
10. See, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Shipping Int'l Co., 549 U.S. 422,429 (2007)
("Dismissal forforum non conveniens reflects a court's assessment of a 'range of considerations,
most notably the convenience to the parties and the practical difficulties that can attend the
adjudication of a dispute in a certain locality."' (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 723 (1996))). While these considerations are indeed relevant to the entire forum non
conveniens analysis, they are questions that should only be posed when a court conducts the
second prong of that analysis and balances the private and public interests of a case.
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Article proposes that a court need not engage in the AAF test where it intends to deny
the motion on the basis of the second prong.1
Part I of this Article reviews the development of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, setting forth the basis for the doctrine as it exists today and suggesting
flaws in the current forum non conveniens system. Part II sets forth a revised test for
courts to use in identifying whether an AAF exists. The Conclusion offers a few final
thoughts about the problems with current forum non conveniens analysis and the
benefits of the test proposed in this Article.
I. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE

Although enacted by statute in many states today, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens developed through the common law. 12 The test for forum non conveniens,
first laid out by the Supreme Court in 1947 for broad application in federal courts in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,13 called on courts to evaluate the litigants'
private interests
4
balanced against the public interests presented by the case.'

11. In other words, following the principles most recently reinforced in Sinochem
IntentionalCo. v. Malay. ShippingInternationalCo., courts can exercise their discretion to skip
the first prong of the analysis where that analysis would not be needed for the court to efficiently
resolve the motion pending before it. 549 U.S. 422.
12. For a thorough discussion of the common law origins of forum non conveniens, see
Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Interestingly, as
the Supreme Court noted in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
[t]he [forum non conveniens] doctrine did not originate in federal but in state
courts. This Court in recognizing and approving it by name has never indicated
that it was rejecting application of the doctrine to law actions which had been an
integral and necessary part of evolution of the doctrine.
330 U.S. 501, 505 n.4 (1947), supersededby statute, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)).
13. 330 U.S. 501. While courts and commentators generally treat GulfOil as the seminal
case on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see, for example, MonegasqueDe Reassurances
S.A.M v. NakNaftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002); Jackson v. GrupoIndus. Hotelero,
S.A., No. 07-22046-CIV-ffUCK/O'SULLIVAN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88922 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
20, 2008); Deston Songs LLC v. Wingspan Records, No. 00 Civ. 8854 (NRB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9763 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2001), the case was not the first Supreme Court case to discuss
forum non conveniens. That distinction belongs to CanadaMalting Co. v. PatersonSteamship,
Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), a case that came before the enactment of the modem Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Gulf Oil discussed several forum non conveniens cases, such as, ErieR.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding law of the state applies in federal diversity cases), before
setting the clear benchmark rule for forum non conveniens in federal court. The Court in Gulf
Oil cited Broderickv. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) and Williams v. North Carolina,317
U.S. 287, 294 n.5 (1942) for the proposition that state courts "'may in appropriate cases apply
the doctrine offorum non conveniens,"' Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 504 (quoting Broderick, 294 U.S.
at 643). The Gulf Oil Court also cited Douglas v. New York, New Haven & HartfordR.R., 279
U.S. 377 (1929), and Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U.S.
373 (1903), to support its assertion that "[e]ven where federal rights binding on state courts
under the Constitution are sought to be adjudged, this Court has sustained state courts in a
refusal to entertain a litigation between a nonresident and a foreign corporation or between two
foreign corporations." Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 504. In setting the stage for its ruling in Gulf Oil,
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In Gulf Oil, a Virginia warehouse owner sued a Pennsylvania delivery company
over the Pennsylvania company's negligence in making a delivery to the Virginia
plaintiff's warehouse. 15 Although Gilbert, the plaintiff, might have sued in Virginia (the
place of the harmful event), he instead decided to file suit in New York, where Gulf
Oil, the defendant, was qualified to do business and had a registered agent for service
of process.16 As in Piper,the facts of GulfOil suggest forum shopping by the plaintiff.
Rather than suing in Pennsylvania (Gulf Oil's place of incorporation), a state that might
have a clearer interest in regulating the affairs of businesses incorporated there, Gilbert
sued in New York, where he believed the law would be most favorable to him.
Although Gulf Oil was qualified to do business in New York, the forum had no other
immediate connection to the case or clear interest in regulating the wrongdoer's
behavior or protecting the alleged victim's interests. 7Pennsylvania might have had an
interest in regulating the behavior of its corporation, while Virginia might have wanted
to protect the interests of the Virginia victim.
The Court in Gulf Oil recognized that it was confronted for the first time with the
need to craft a federal rule for "investing courts with a discretion to change the place of
trial."' 8 While many states had crafted a forum non conveniens rule, federal courts had
not. The Court then identified a series of factors it considered relevant in determining
when forum one (F l), where a lawsuit was originally filed, should defer to F2, even
though F l had jurisdiction to hear the case.' 9
the Court also noted that "[o]n substantiallyforum non conveniens grounds we have required
federal courts to relinquish decision of cases within their jurisdiction where the court would
have to participate in the administrative policy of a state." 330 U.S. at 505. The Court supported
its argument with citations to R.R. Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570

(1941), and Burfordv. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), but mentioned contrary authority with
a citation to Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
14. Although the private and public interests are generally treated today as carrying equal
weight (indeed, they are treated together as a single part of the modem two-part inquiry for
forum non conveniens), the Court in Gulf Oil seemed to suggest that the private interests of the
litigants were paramount, noting that "[a]n interest to be considered, and the one likely to be
most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant," whereas with regard to the public interest,
the Court explained that "[f]actors of public interest also haveplace in applying the doctrine."
GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 502. Gilbert alleged that Gulf Oil's negligence in delivering gasoline to his
warehouse led to an explosion and fire that destroyed the building and damaged merchandise
stored inside. Id.
16. Id. at 503. In fact Gulf Oil was qualified to do business both in New York and Virginia
and had registered agents in both states. Id.
17. See id.

18. Id. at 507.
19. Those factors, for which GulfOil is best known, are broken down into two categories:
private interests and public interests. Private interests involve issues focused primarily on the
interests of the parties to the lawsuit, including the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of viewing the premises if viewing would
be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability ofajudgment
if one is obtained. Id. at 508. Public-interest factors, by contrast, include considerations that
weigh on the court systems involved and those potentially involved in the litigation and the
interest of the citizenry where those courts sit. Those factors include the burden on the court's
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Weighing the private and public interests, the Court concluded that while the New
York courts had jurisdiction over Gulf Oil, the case should be dismissed on the basis of
forum non conveniens with leave to be refiled in Virginia. 20 The Court preferred
Virginia to New York because it agreed with Gulf Oil that all of the events at the heart
of the litigation occurred there, the plaintiff resided there, the defendant did business
there, most of the witnesses were located there,21and, like the courts of New York, the
Virginia courts had jurisdiction over Gulf Oil.
In reaching its conclusion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be used
in these circumstances, the Court noted that it had "repeatedly recognized the existence
of the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances." 22 The Court then
quoted Justice Brandeis:
Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not
universally true; else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the

ground that the litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts
administering other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of law also
occasionally decline, in the interest ofjustice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the
suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litigation

can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.23
In 1948, just one year after the Supreme Court's ruling in GulfOil, Congress passed
an omnibus bill overhauling the judicial code,24 which governs the judiciary and
judicial procedure. As a part of that overhaul, Congress enacted a venue-transfer
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 25 Although § 1404 largely codified the common law,26 it
docket and on potential jurors. Id. Ultimately, as the Court noted, the public factors boil down to
a simple consideration (simple at least so long as the relevant events all or mostly occurred in
one place): "[t]here is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." Id.at
509.
20. Id.at 512. The Court did emphasize that its basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the
case, diversity jurisdiction, was a consideration in its decision to reverse the Second Circuit and
restore the district court's original dismissal of the action in favor of the Virginia courts. Id.
21. Id. at 510-12.
22. Id.at 504.
23. Id.(quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422-23 (1932)).
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-4001 (2006).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). As the Court described in Exparte Collett:
The new Code, however, provides that "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought." This is § 1404(a).
The reviser's notes, which accompany each section of the Code, here read as
follows: "Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the
venue is proper."
ExparteCollett, 337 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1949) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A132 (1947)).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A 132 (1947); H.R.REP No. 79-2646, at A127 (1946). For
a succinct summary of the legislative intent behind § 1404, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,Forum-SelectionClauses, and the Rehnquist
Court, 40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 479 (1992), which argues that "[t]he statement of 'legislative
purpose' that accompanied Section 1404 was concise if elliptical." See also Walter W. Heiser,
Forum Selection Clauses in FederalCourts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and
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contained one significant difference which relates to the process by which cases move
from F1 to F2. Under § 1404, cases that are brought in the proper venue are transferred
without ever being dismissed from F 1.27 By contrast, a successful forum non
conveniens motion leads to the dismissal of the case in F 1, leaving the plaintiff the
right to refile in F2,2 s assuming that the statute of limitations has not run (or that the
defendant waived any statute of limitations defense as a condition of dismissal in F 1).29
The transfer statute's enactment had a dramatic impact on forum non conveniens,
limiting its scope in federal court to cases involving dismissal to a foreign forum,
otherwise the new domestic transfer statute would apply. 30 To be clear, § 1404 would
have had a direct impact on the parties in Gulf Oil. A case with identical facts arising
after the enactment of § 1404 would necessarily mean that, faced with two domestic
parties seeking transfer from a federal court in New York to a federal court in Virginia,

Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REv. 553, 569-70 n.76 (1993) ("What there is indicates that §
1404(a) was intended to codify the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, and
to provide courts with great flexibility in determining whether venue transfer is necessary for

convenience and in the interests of justice."). The specific historical concern that prompted
Congress to enact § 1404(a) was the perceived exploitation of liberal federal venue provisions
by plaintiffs who selected forums with little connection to the claim to use geography as a
litigation weapon. See Purcell, supra,at 478-83.
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006); Heiser, supra note 26, at 554.
28. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 517; see also Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp.
Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357,363-66(6th Cir. 2008); Saab v. Citibank, N.A., 50 F. App'x 467 (2d
Cir. 2002); Leetsch v. Freedman, 260 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2001); Trigano v. Bain & Co., No.
98-7475, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14626 (2d Cir. June 29, 1999). For a discussion on this point
and on one set of practical concerns of forum non conveniens dismissals, see Russell J.
Weintraub, InternationalLitigationand Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 335
(1994).
29. See John Bies, Comment, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CH. L. REV.
489, 501-02 (2000) (arguing that under forum non conveniens many courts require defendants
to waive any statute-of-limitations defenses in the alternate forum, and that "such a requirement
serves to protect the practical as well as theoretical availability of the forum for the plaintiff's
claims").
30. The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens also applies when the AAF is a
state court. See, e.g., SRS, Inc. v. Airflex Indus., No. 07-6122 (KSH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
88220, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2008) ("The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
survives in federal courts to apply only where the alternative forum is a state court or the court
of a foreign country." (citing Tantus Prods., Inc. v. Lloyd, No. 86-1535, 1988 WL 48511, at *3
(6th Cir. May 16, 1988))); Penn Nat'l Ins. Co. v. E. Homes, Inc., No. RDB-07-672, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85667, at *13 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 2007) ("The Defendants'forum non conveniens
argument is essentially based on the fact that there is an underlying state cause of action in the
Circuit Court for Howard County."); Wells' Dairy v. Estate of Richardson, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1056 (N.D. Iowa 2000) ("Texas state court is an adequate alternative forum"); Hammond N.
Assocs., Ltd. v. ABG Fin. Servs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ("There can be
no doubt that an adequate, alternative forum is available in the state court in Fulton County,
Georgia. That court presently possesses jurisdiction over the whole case."); Tisdale v. Stone &
Webster Eng'g Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D. Miss. 1984) ("The Court concludes that
the Plaintiff has an alternative forum, the Louisiana Courts or the Louisiana Workers'
Compensation Administration, in which to proceed with this action.").
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forum3 1 non conveniens could not be invoked-§ 1404 alone would govern such a
case.

Thus, while Congress acted soon after Gulf Oil, its approach differed from that
taken by the Supreme Court.32 Perhaps vindicating Justice Black's dissenting view in
GulfOil,33 Congress was more lenient towards plaintiffs who had filed their cases in
federal court by allowing the cases to be transferred without the risks inherent in
dismissal.34 In analyzing § 1404(a) in a 1964 decision, Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro35
the court concluded that the statute "should be regarded as a federal judicial
housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the federal courts
and generally intended ... simply to authorize a change of courtrooms. ' 36 Similarly,
the scant legislative history of § 1406(a) indicates
that when venue is improper, it
37
should be used to transfer, not dismiss cases.
State legislatures, much like Congress, have demonstrated their willingness to
legislate forum non conveniens doctrine. In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court held that
the legislature had abolished forum non conveniens under section 71.031 of the Texas
Code 38 in actions for wrongful death or personal injury. 39 The majority rested its
decision on statutory construction, 40 while the concurrence by Justice Doggett focused
on the policy concerns of preventing Texas corporations from avoiding liability for the
harm they caused abroad through the use of forum non conveniens.41 Acting swiftly,

31. As a result, forum non conveniens dismissals in federal court today can only occur
where the federal court is transferring either to a foreign court or, in rare circumstances, to a
state court in a state other than the one where the federal court sits. Somewhat surprisingly, the
data reveal that a number of federal courts mistakenly consider forum non conveniens motions
under circumstances that should fall directly under §§ 1404 and 1406 (where a case is being sent
from one federal court to another federal court). The data set included 169 domestic cases,
including seventy-three cases with a discussion of an adequate alternative forum, many (though
not all) of which properly considered forum non conveniens dismissal to a state court.
32. For more on this point, see Lear, supra note 2.
33. See infranote 255.

34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006); see also, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31
(1955) (arguing that under the doctrine of forum non conveniens a plaintiff could "'lose out
completely, through the running of the statute of limitations,"' whereas 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
protects against such a danger (quoting All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010,
1011 (3d Cir. 1952))).
35. 786 S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. 1990).
36. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-37 (1964).
37. See Roberto Finzi, Note, The 28 US.C. 1406(a) Transferof Time-Barred Claims, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 975, 983 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. No. 79-2646, at A127 (1946)). As with 28
U.S.C. § 1404, the legislative history on §1406(a) is sparse. Thus, the statute, including its
extensive protection of plaintiffs, has been interpreted and applied broadly through case law. See
Bies, supra note 29.
38. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 2008).
39. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 674.
40. Id. ("Because we conclude that the legislature has statutorily abolished the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in suits brought under section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.").
41. Id. at 680-81 (Doggett, J., concurring) ("Because the 'doctrine' [of forum non
conveniens that the dissenters] advocate has nothing to do with fairness and convenience and
everything to do with immunizing multinational corporations from accountability for their
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much like Congress in the wake of Gulf Oil, the Texas legislature overruled Alfaro
when it passed section 70.05 1(b), which states:
If a court of this state . . . finds that in the interest of justice and for the

convenience of the parties a claim or action to which this section applies would be
more properly heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall decline to
exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.42
While courts had occasion to invoke forum non conveniens regularly over the thirtyfive years following GulfOil,no major developments in the federal doctrine occurred
until the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, a case 43
in
which the Court expanded and purported to clarify the forum non conveniens test.
Piperpresented the very type of transborder personal-injury scenario that troubles
so many courts faced with forum non conveniens motions. A twin-engine Piper Aztec
airplane, flying from Blackpool, England, to Perth, Scotland, crashed in the Scottish
Highlands, killing all five passengers aboard as well as the pilot. 44 All were Scottish
citizens. 45 Their families hired counsel in Scotland who pursued litigation there and
also referred the families to a lawyer in the United States. 46 Because the airplane was
manufactured in Pennsylvania and the propeller had been manufactured in Ohio, and
both were among the possible causes of the crash, the United States was connected to
this plane crash in the Scottish Highlands.47 The case was filed in the United States in
July 1977, one year before an action was filed in Scotland.48
Piper involved some strange procedural twists, in large measure because the
plaintiffs' lawyer used an aggressive strategy to file his case in the California state
court-the court that he believed would lead to the most favorable recovery for his
clients. 49 The lawyers for the defendants successfully removed the case to federal court
alleged torts causing injury abroad, I write separately.").
42. TEx. Civ. PRAc.&REM. CODE ANN. § 70.051 (b) (Vernon 2008); see also De Aguilar v.
Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the legislature had overruled
Alfaro when it passed section 70.051).
43. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
44. Id.
at 238-39.
45. Id. at 239.
46. Clermont, supra note 5, at 197.
47. The plaintiffs' case turned on the cause of the accident, and their theories included: (1)
a manufacturing defect in the airplane itself (Pennsylvania); (2) a manufacturing defect in the
propeller (Ohio); and (3) pilot error (Scotland).
48. Like so many forum non conveniens cases, Piper is a case of concurrent litigation;
indeed, the first-filed action was the American case, which was filed one year before its Scottish
counterpart. Unlike many cases of concurrent litigation where the plaintiff is suing in F 1and the
defendant brings suit in F2, the plaintiff filed suit in both forums, presumably provoked to file in
Scotland by a two-year statute of limitations that was set to expire when the Scottish action was
filed.
49. The lawyer, Daniel Cathcart, arranged for his legal secretary, Gaynell Reyno, to be

appointed as administratrix of the passengers' estates. With a California administratrix, the case
could be filed in California state courts that otherwise had no connection to the crash and, unlike

Ohio and Pennsylvania, had no meaningful connection to assessing liability and apportioning
responsibility for the disaster. For an in-depth and entertaining discussion of the Pipercase, see
Clermont, supra note 5. As in Gulf Oil, this aggressive tactic by the plaintiffs in which they
(perhaps not unreasonably) sought the most favorable law, led them to file the initial case in a
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in California and then persuaded the federal court to transfer the case to Piper's home
state of Pennsylvania by using the federal transfer statutes. 50 Having successfully
brought the case into the federal courts and across the country, the defendants then
sought the knockout blow-a dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens. 5 1
The district court granted the defendants' motion, finding that Scotland provided an
alternative forum and then concluding that the private and public interests in the case
favored Scotland as the forum for the action.5 2 The Third Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal on both grounds.5 3 First, the court of appeals reasoned that dismissal
should not be allowed where, as here, F2 offered less favorable law.54 Second, the
court of appeals found that the district court had abused its discretion by relying too
heavily on the Scottish connection to the case while ignoring the interests of an
American forum in regulating the operations of its manufacturers and giving too little
weight to documents and witnesses that might be located in the United States that
would be necessary to adjudicate at least some of the plaintiffs' claims.55

state (California) with a tenuous connection to the case rather than in Scotland (the victims'
place of residence), Pennsylvania (the airplane manufacturer's place of incorporation), or Ohio
(the propeller manufacturer's place of incorporation). The forum non conveniens purist is left to
note that the Supreme Court's two most aggressive efforts to stake out a clear doctrine of forum
non conveniens (in both cases holding that the motions should be granted and the cases
dismissed) have come in cases where F 1 did not have a strong connection to or interest in the
case.

50. Piper,454 U.S. at 240-41. Piper succeeded in transferring the case under 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a), while Hartzell, the Ohio-based propeller manufacturer, had its case transferred under
28 U.S.C. §1406(a).
51. Id. at241.
52. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 738 (M.D. Penn. 1979), rev'd,630 F.2d
149 (1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The district court did condition dismissal on an
agreement by both defendants to waive their personal jurisdiction and statute of limitations
defenses in Scotland. The court stated that:
The action will be dismissed on the conditions that the Defendants waive any
defense that they might have relating to any statute of limitations that did not exist
prior to the initiation of this suit and that they abide by their stipulation to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts.

Id.
53. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 171 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235

(1981).
54. Id. at 163-64. The court of appeals reasoned that it is apparent that the dismissal would
work a change in the applicable law so that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would be
eliminated from the case.
But... a dismissal for forum non conveniens, like a statutory transfer "should not,
despite its convenience, result in a change in the applicable law." Only when
American law is not applicable, or when the foreign jurisdiction would, as a matter
of its own choice of law, give the plaintiff the benefit of the claim to which she is
entitled here, would dismissal be justified.
Id. at 164 (quoting DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1977)) (footnote
omitted).
55. Id. at 159-62.
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The Supreme Court took the case and made it clear that its goal was to address the
questions raised "concerning the proper application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens." 56 The Court held:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the
substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to
the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. The possibility of a change in
conclusive or even substantial
substantive law should ordinarily not be given
57
weight in theforum non conveniens inquiry.
Had the Court stopped at this point, lower courts might have had some guidance for
future cases. Instead, in an apparent reversal of position, the Court noted that "[w]e do
not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should never be a relevant
consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry., 58 This first point of confusion
generated by Piper-thetype of confusion at the heart of this Article-reflects the type
of mixed message that has left lower courts interpreting Piper's instructions in different
and often conflicting ways.

56. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 246 (1981).
The Court noted that certiorari had been granted on two issues: first,
[w]hether, in an action in federal district court brought by foreign plaintiffs against
American defendants, the plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground
offorum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be
applied if the case were litigated in the district court is more favorable to them
than the law that would be applied by the courts of their own nation.
Id. at 246 n.12 (quotation marks omitted). And second, whether "a motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens [should] be denied whenever the law ofthe alternate forum is
(alteration
less favorable to recovery than that which would be applied by the district court." Id.
in original) (quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 247. In reaching this result, the Court expressly reaffirmed its holding in Canada
Malting Co. v. PatersonSteamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), a case that had predated Gulf
Oil. The Court in Piper cited to Canada Malting, which said that "'the court will not take
cognizance of the case ifjustice would be as well done by remitting the parties to their home
forum."' Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413,419-20 (1932) (quoting Charter
Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515, 517 (1930)). Notably, both the
plaintiff and defendant in that case were Canadian. And though their claim arose out of a
collision in American waters, their remaining connections to the United States were slim.
58. Piper,454 U.S. at 254. "Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where
the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute." Id. at 255
n.22 (citing Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (D. Del. 1978) (refusing to
dismiss where alternative forum is Ecuador, it is unclear whether the Ecuadorean tribunal will
hear the case, and there is no generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust
enrichment and tort claims asserted)). Note, too, that the Court's example for a case where
Ecuador is not an AAF is itself unclear, even in the Court's formulation. Was Ecuador deemed
to be unavailable because it was unclear whether an Ecuadorean tribunal would hear the case?
Or was it the absence of a remedy? Or perhaps some confluence of the two factors? This type of
confusion, explicit in the Court's own characterization of the Phoenix Canada Oil case,
demonstrates the uncertainty cast upon lower courts by the Pipercase.
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More fundamental to the overarching confusion created by Piper, the Court
emphasized the importance of retaining the flexibility of the forum non conveniens
standard, concluding that "if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the
possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become
virtually useless." 59 The Court then entered into a lengthy discussion of the need to
allow courts the flexibility to dismiss cases where the plaintiff might suffer an
unfavorable change in the law. 60 Without such flexibility, the Court reasoned, a foreign
plaintiff's case against an American manufacturer could never be dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds. 61 It is important to note that the Supreme Court's admonition
in Pipercame in the context of its discussion of the basic principles of forum non
conveniens, but not in a specific discussion of the availability of an alternative forum.62
In Piper,the Court for the first time articulated a standard that would distinguish
between domestic and foreign plaintiffs for forum non conveniens purposes. The Court
emphasized that a foreign plaintiff's choice of an American forum should be entitled to
less deference than a domestic plaintiff's choice. That rule results not from a desire to
prejudice foreign parties but rather from an assumption concerning the ultimate
convenience of the forum.
When the [plaintiff's] home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that
this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption
is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of anyforum non conveniens
inquiry is to ensure
that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves
63
less deference.
Moreover, as the Second Circuit has noted, "this reduced weight 'is not an invitation to
accord a foreign plaintiff's selection of an American forum no deference since
dismissal for forum non conveniens is the exception rather than the rule." '4Above all,
though, none of this deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum should speak to the
availability of an alternative forum. Instead, this deference should weigh in a court's
analysis of the private interest factors, part of the second prong of the forum non

59. Id. at 250.
60. See id.
at 251-54.

61. Id. at251-52.
62. See id.
at 251-54.
63. Id. at 255-56. Of course, if the Court had been truly inclined to craft a rule along these
lines that did not discriminate against foreign parties, then only an American plaintiff suing in
his place of domicile would be favored and other American plaintiffs suing in a jurisdiction
outside their home state (perhaps because of beneficial laws or juries in another state) would
receive the same treatment as foreign parties.
64. R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Also in at least one important case, the Second Circuit creatively
construed a foreign plaintiff to be entitled to treatment as a domestic party for purposes of the
forum non conveniens analysis. See Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between United States and
Ireland required national treatment for Irish citizens, meaning that Irish plaintiff would be
entitled to same deference in choice of forum as an American plaintiff would have in forum non
conveniens analysis).
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conveniens analysis. Alas, because of the lack of clarity found in the Pipertest, many
courts apply this heightened
or reduced deference to both prongs of the forum non
65
conveniens analysis.
The Court in Piper also blurred the line between the AAF test and the balancing of
private and public interests by reducing the AAF test to a seemingly simple inquiry.
According to Piper,the requirement of an alternative forum is ordinarily satisfied ifthe
defendant is amenable to service of process in another jurisdiction except in "rare
circumstances" when "the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly
unsatisfactory." 66 This formulation of the AAF test is problematic in at least two
respects. First, it turns the presumption of forum non conveniens on its head. Instead of
articulating a doctrine that should be invoked to dismiss cases in federal courts only in
"rare cases," 67 the PiperAAF inquiry creates an opposite presumption (amenability to
service of process is sufficient): an alternative forum is presumed to be available,
except in rare circumstances. Second, the exception to the presumption of availability
involves a single inquiry into whether "the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly
unsatisfactory." 68 Courts have been left wide ambit to interpret that condition narrowly
or broadly as they see fit. Moreover, factors that actually involve the availability of F2
but that do not fit into the exception to AAF carved out in Piperare simply thrown into
the mix of public factors considered under the second prong of the forum non
conveniens analysis.
Two cases illustrate the problems created by the Piperdecision and the uncertain
forum non conveniens test it has created. The first involves the much-publicized case
filed in New York in the wake of the Union Carbide chemical disaster in India. From
December 2-3, 1984, a chemical plant owned by Union Carbide India Limited6 9 leaked
highly toxic gas, killing more than 2000 people and injuring over 200,000.70 "Four
days after the Bhopal accident ... the first of some 145 purported class actions in
federal district courts in the United States" were filed. 71 Eventually those cases were
consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and assigned to the
Southern District of New York.72

65. See, e.g., Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-74 (2d Cir. 2001)
(establishing the current Second Circuit rule that "first level of inquiry" in forum non
conveniens analysis is deciding deference given to plaintiff's choice of forum based on fivefactor test).
66. Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
67. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,509 (1947), supersededby statute, Pub. L. No.
80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)); see also Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) ("In rare circumstances, federal courts can relinquish
their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.").
68. Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
69. A majority of the shares in Union Carbide India Limited, incorporated in India, were
owned by Union Carbide Corporation, an American corporation with its headquarters in New
York. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), afFdasmodified, 809 F.2d 195 (1987).
70. Id.
at 844.
71. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,809 F.2d
195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987).
72. Id.
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The district court reviewed the complaint and dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds. 73 Much of the district court's sixty-three page opinion was devoted to the
private and public interest factors that make up the second prong of the forum non
conveniens analysis. 74 By contrast, the district court devoted very little attention to the
AAF inquiry, finding that India offered an adequate alternative forum. 75 The district
court's dismissal was conditioned upon Union Carbide (1) submitting to jurisdiction in
India; (2) waiving any statute-of-limitation defenses; (3) agreeing to satisfy any
judgment of the Indian courts; and (4) agreeing to be subject to discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.76
The fourth condition of the district court's dismissal-application of American
discovery rules in an Indian proceeding-raises grave questions about the adequacy of
the Indian forum in that court's eyes. Such a condition demonstrates that the district
court did not have complete faith that the Indian court's procedural devices were
sufficient to allow the plaintiffs to secure justice. While it is unclear whether these
procedural concerns alone would have rendered the Indian forum unavailable in the
eyes of the district court, this case provides a stark example of an American court
glossing over the AAF inquiry, even when it has legitimate concerns about whether F2
is truly available.77
One of the underlying concerns implicit in the decisions in the Bhopal case (both
for the district court and for the Second Circuit) involves possible forum shopping by
the plaintiff. The problem of plaintiff forum shopping is longstanding and has been
noted by domestic and foreign courts alike.78 Union Carbideraises a different specter

73. In re Union Carbide,634 F. Supp. at 867.
74. See id. at 852-67.
75. See id at 847-52.
76. Id. at 867. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but found error with two of the
conditions of the district court's dismissal. In re Union Carbide,809 F.2d at 204-06 (finding
conditions requiring Union Carbide to agree to satisfy any judgment of Indian courts and to
submit to American discovery practices in error and striking them from order of dismissal).
77. The district court's discovery conditions are discussed here to illustrate the ease with
which courts conflate concerns about the competence of a foreign forum (an appropriate factor
in the AAF inquiry) with the second stage of the forum non conveniens inquiry, where
conditional dismissals might overcome certain concerns raised in balancing the public and
private interests. Given the fundamental differences between American discovery and discovery
rules abroad, one might imagine that any American court might similarly question the ability of
a foreign forum to adequately hear a case absent American discovery rules, but that is not the
argument made here. Indeed, as discussed in Part II, the purpose of the AAF inquiry is to ensure
that the alternative forum is adequate and not identical. See infra Part II.E.
78. As Lord Denning famously wrote, "As a moth is drawn to light, so is a litigant drawn to
the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune." Smith
Kline & French Labs., Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982) (Eng.). Aside from
the problem of forum shopping by defendants raised by these cases, courts are mistaken to
believe that forum shopping by a plaintiff should be a basis for a court to dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens. For an excellent and extended discussion of why plaintiff's forum
shopping probably should not be used by courts as a reason to dismiss on forum non conviens
grounds, see Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 732-33 (E.D. La. 2002). See
also Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n. 12 (4th Cir. 1987) (arguing forum shopping is
not evil); DeSantis v. Hafner Creations, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 419, 424 n.14 (D. Va. 1996)

2010]

RETHINKING THE FORUMNON CONVENIENS ANALYSIS

1073

that should be cause for at least some inquiry if not concern--defendants who forum
shop by creating an alternative forum through conditioned dismissals. 79 This type of
forum shopping should be discouraged much like plaintiff forum shopping. Indeed, the
forum non conveniens analysis should be focused on a broader set of questions aimed
at identifying the proper forum to hear a case when more than one forum has the
capacity to hear it.
Murray v. British Broadcasting Corp.80 demonstrates a second and more
fundamental set of problems in post-Piper forum non conveniens analysis. Not as
publicized as Union Carbide,Murray involved a copyright infringement and unfair
competition lawsuit filed by a British costume designer against the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 8' In his lawsuit, Murray alleged that the BBC had
violated his rights by using a costume he had designed for a fictitious television
character named Mr. Blobby. 82 Murray considered suing in England, but he could
to
afford neither the £100,000 to £200,000 he was told by lawyers would be needed
83
take his case to trial nor the security required to receive a loan in that amount.
Guided by the Supreme Court's earlier suggestion that the forum non conveniens
inquiry should be driven by the need to retain flexibility, the Second Circuit examined
financial hardship when balancing the private and public factors in the second prong of
the forum non conveniens inquiry rather than as part of the inquiry into the availability
of England as an alternative forum.8 The court decided that "Murray's claim of
financial hardship may not be considered in determining the availability of an
be deferred to the balancing of interests relating to the
alternative forum but must
85
forum's convenience."
The Second Circuit in Murray reasoned that to include this factor in the AAF
inquiry (which would presumably weigh heavily against a finding that England was
available to Murray) "would render the financial burden on the plaintiff the
'determinative factor,' notwithstanding overwhelming public and private interests

("[S]trictly speaking, venue and long-arm statutes authorize some degree of legitimate forum
shopping."); John Fellas, Strategy in InternationalLitigation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 317,
321 (2008) (pointing out that although forum shopping is often considered to be negative, it is
commonsensical that if you give plaintiff choice in venue he will pick the one that is most
favorable to his case); Emil Petrossian, In Pursuitofthe PerfectForum: TransnationalForum
Shopping in the UnitedStates and England,40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1257,1271 (2007) (arguing
that, because of how forum non conveniens is applied, defendants can now reverse forum shop
and noting this possibility was expressly considered in Piper and determined to be
inconsequential).
79. Within twenty-five months of the Second Circuit's decision modifying the forum non
conveniens dismissal, the Indian government approved a settlement of all claims whereby Union
Carbide and UCIL agreed to pay the Indian government $470 million for the benefit of the
victims of the disaster. Steve Dodson, $470 Million Accord in Bhopal Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1989, at 14; see also Russell J. Weintraub, InternationalLitigation and Forum Non
Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 335 (1994) (discussing settlement).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

81 F.3d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 289.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 292.
Id. at 292-93 (emphasis in original).
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weighing in favor of dismissal of the American action., 8 6 Indeed, the Second Circuit
then proceeded to fall into the very pit that has haunted so many courts post-Piper and
that cries out for a new, clearer AAF test when it noted that to allow financial burden
on the plaintiff to become the determinative factor "would ignore the Supreme Court's
admonition that '[i]f central emphasis [is] placed on any one factor, the forum non
87
conveniens doctrine would lose much of the flexibility that makes it so valuable.'
The problem with this analysis is that the Supreme Court's admonition in Piper
came in the context of its discussion of the basic principles of forum non conveniens,
but not in a specific discussion of the availability of an alternative forum. Flexibility is
certainly valuable when courts are weighing the private and public interests and courts
can and should have discretion in that inquiry. But that prong should only be reached
when a court has established that an alternative forum exists for the action. As the
Supreme Court specifically pointed out in Gulf Oil, application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine "presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process." 88 Thus, the AAF inquiry is a precondition for the discretionary
forum non conveniens inquiry in which courts balance private and public interests in
deciding whether to dismiss a case in favor of another forum.
In May 2007, more than twenty-five years after Piper,the Court expanded the
doctrine-or at least its application-in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
InternationalShipping Co. 89 The Court's unanimous decision in Sinochem allows

86. Id. at 292 (quoting Coakes v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 1987))
(citation omitted).
87. Id.
(citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,249-50 (1981)). The result-driven
approach suggested by the Second Circuit in Murray directly follows one line of cases ina split
that had taken place in the years after Piper.
There is a division of authority on whether financial hardships facing a plaintiff in an
alternative forum as a result of the absence of contingent fee arrangements may cause a forum to
be deemed unavailable. Compare Rudetsky v. O'Dowd, 660 F.Supp. 341,346 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
("The lack of a contingency fee system . . . does not constitute one of those [rare]

circumstances."), with McKrell v. Penta Hotels, 703 F.Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying
motion to reject magistrate's report which concluded that alternative forum was not available in
part because it had no contingent-fee system). The majority of courts deem a plaintiff's financial
hardships resulting from the absence of contingent fee arrangements to be only one factor to be
weighed in determining the balance of convenience after the court determines that an alternative
forum is available. See Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1393 n. 2 & 1398 (8th Cir. 1991)
(as part of analysis of private interests favoring or counseling against dismissal, court must
consider practical problems, financial and otherwise, encountered by plaintiffs) (citing Rudetsky,
660 F.Supp. at 346); Coakes v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 575 (5th Cir.1987)
(plaintiff pointing to absence of contingent fee system "cannot actually argue that England is not
an available, alternate forum" because defendant is amenable to process there); Kryvicky v.
Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 807 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that financial burden on
plaintiff "is only one factor used in the balancing process, and it alone would not bar dismissal
based on forum non conveniens").

For further discussion of the substance of these concerns as part of the AAF test, see infra
Part II.D.
88. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,506-07 (1947), supersededby statute,Pub. L.
No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)).
89. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
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federal courts to rule on forum non conveniens motions before establishing
that the
90
court has jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of the case.
Sinochem involved a dispute between a Chinese importer of steel coils (Sinochem)
and a Malaysian vessel owner (Malaysia International) involving the timeliness of
loading and shipping steel coils for delivery to Sinochem. 9' The seller of the coils was
an American corporation not party to the lawsuit.92 The coils had been loaded on the
Malaysian-owned vessel in Philadelphia, and the lawsuit involved alleged backdating
of the bill of lading by the vessel's owner. 93 That backdating would have occurred
when the coils were loaded in Philadelphia, which was the only connection between the
United States and the litigation between these two foreign parties. 94
On June 8, 2003, after a dispute had arisen, Sinochem petitioned a Chinese
admiralty court for interim relief (preservation of a maritime claim and arrest of a
vessel), alleging that Malaysia International backdated the bill of lading for the coil
delivery. 95 The Chinese court ordered arrest of the vessel and various other interim
measures. 96 On July 2, 2003, Sinochem timely filed its complaint against Malaysia
International, reiterating its claims of misrepresentation and fraud.97 In the interim,
though, on June 23, 2003, Malaysia International filed a case in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania alleging misrepresentations by Sinochem to the Chinese court and asking
98
for compensation for losses incurred due to the arrest of the vessel in China.
Sinochem sought to dismiss the case on a variety of grounds, including lack of99subject
matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed an ideal opportunity in this case to clarify
an important, uncertain area of the law, which was at the heart of the dispute in
Sinochem: the problem of concurrent jurisdiction. 1° Rather than seeing this case for

90. See id. at 425 ("[A] court need not resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the
cause (subject-matter jurisdiction) or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines
that, in any event, a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the
case.").
91. Seeid at426.

92. Id.
93. See id
94. See id

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.

98. See id.
at 427.
99. Id.

100. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction (when there are competing cases in different
jurisdictions), courts generally defer to the court first seised of the action (either by dismissing
or staying the second action). However, courts in the United States are sharply divided on the
methods that should be used to decide whether and on what terms to dismiss or stay an action
when faced with concurrent litigation in a foreign forum. For extended discussion of some of the
problems posed by concurrent jurisdiction, see N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity:
Towards a Coherent Treatment ofInternationalParallelProceedings,27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 601 (2006); Jocelyn H. Bush, Note, To Abstain OrNot To Abstain?: A New FrameworkFor
Application of the Abstention Doctrine in InternationalParallelProceedings,58 AM. U. L.

REV. 127 (2008). For a thoughtful case considering how to handle these kinds of cases and
favoring an international abstention doctrine, see Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film
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what it was-a concurrent jurisdiction case where the Chinese case was the first suit
filedl°'-the Court chose to use this case and its easy facts10 2 to expand the application
of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Relying heavily on the reasoning in RuhrgasA G v. MarathonOil Co.,'0 3 the Court
concluded that, while "jurisdictional questions ordinarily must precede merits
determinations in dispositional order," 1°4 judicial efficiency would be promoted by
establishing a rule that "where subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to
determine, and forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily
in favor of
10 5
dismissal, the court properly takes the less burdensome course."'
In light of Sinochem's invitation for courts to rule on forum non conveniens at an
earlier stage of litigation where appropriate, the time is ripe to investigate whether
courts are applying the forum non conveniens analysis appropriately and uniformly
and, if they are not, to propose a better mechanism to accomplish the goals of the
forum non conveniens doctrine.
The discussion of Gulf Oil, Piper,Union Carbide,Murray, andSinochem traces the
development of the forum non conveniens doctrine through its major cases. That
development can also be seen through a review of every published
federal court
0 6
decision since 1982 that has considered forum non conveniens.
GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11 th Cir. 1994).
101. The one tricky factual question in the concurrent-litigation inquiry would have turned
on which case was actually first filed (the Chinese action or the American case filed on June 23)
based on whether the Chinese action was deemed to have been initiated on June 8 or July 2.
102. This case had "easy facts" from a forum non conveniens perspective because the fact
that the case had already been filed in a Chinese court (and the fact that that court had already
considered and dismissed Malaysia International's jurisdictional objections) removed the need
for a searing AAF analysis. Similarly, the balance of private and public interests seemed to
weigh in favor of the Chinese court, though perhaps not as heavily as the Court believed, given
that the location of the loading of the ship (Pennsylvania), a United States forum, was connected
to the heart of the dispute. Perhaps more important, because the case had already been filed
elsewhere, the Court did not need to impose any conditions on the dismissal, thereby leaving for
another day some of the trickier questions posed by the holding in Sinochem for cases involving
conditional dismissals.
103. 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999).
104. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (citing
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)).
105. Id. at 436.

106. The data set collected for analysis in this Article covers data from federal cases (from
bankruptcy court and U.S. district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court) since 1982
(the year after the landmark Piper case). The raw data set, consisting of 5114 cases, was built
from searches of the LexisNexis for Law Schools online database using the phrase "forum non
conveniens." The initial search was intentionally overly inclusive to ensure that all (or virtually
all) cases in federal court where courts had considered a forum non conveniens motion were
considered. As cases were manually analyzed, data points were stored in a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet. A subset of the cases, representing the 1447 cases considering forum non
conveniens, was imported into a Microsoft Access database for further analysis. The data set is
housed at the University of South Carolina School of Law, Columbia, South Carolina.
For each case, the following information was noted and recorded: (1) whether the plaintiff
was foreign or domestic; (2) whether the defendant was foreign or domestic; (3) whether both
plaintiff and defendant were domestic; (4) whether both plaintiff and defendant were foreign; (5)
whether the issue decided by the court was actually an issue of transfer under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404
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For example, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that forum non
in "rare cases,"' 0 7
conveniens should be invoked to dismiss cases in federal courts only
08
the trend has been to grant such motions more often than that.'
Of greater concern, courts conducted an AAF analysis in 999 of the 1447 data set
cases considering forum non conveniens (69%). Given the dictates of Piper, one
should expect that when presented with a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non
conveniens, courts would conduct an AAF analysis one hundred percent of the time.
Becasue Piperreiterates the two-part inquiry from GulfOil, the data demonstrates the
extent to which, even at the most basic level of analysis, courts are not conducting the
proper forum non conveniens inquiry. In addition, courts that went on to dismiss a case
on the basis of forum non conveniens only conducted an AAF analysis 76% of the
time. Even under the standard proposed in this Article, 109 which would allow a court to
bypass the AAF inquiry where it intends to deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens, a court still would be expected to conduct an AAF in every case
where the motion to dismiss would be granted.
There is little consistency among the circuits in the definition and application of the
Supreme Court's PiperAAF test. Four circuits appear to follow Piper in looking for
the existence of an AAF. 110 Five circuits expand Piperby using a two-prong test for the
or 1406; (6) whether the court considered issues ofjurisdiction before reaching the forum non
conveniens issue; (7) whether the court reached forum non conveniens at all; (8) whether the
court granted forum non conveniens; or (9) denied it; (10) in cases where the court considered
forum non conveniens, whether it considered the question of AAF; and if so (11) if forum non
conveniens was denied, whether it was denied for lack of an AAF; (12) when an AAF was not
found, whether that was because the court concluded that no available forum existed or simply,
as in a number of cases identified and discussed more fully below, the court simply found that
the defendant had failed to meet its burden of proof on the AAF question; (13) what factors (if
any) the court used to determine the AAF issue; and (14) coding for the subject matter of the
lawsuit (tort, contract, copyright, etc.).
107. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,509 (1947), supersededby statute,Pub. L. No.
80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)); see also Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) (noting that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
derives from the proposition that "in rare circumstances, federal courts can relinquish their
jurisdiction in favor of another forum").
108. In the five-year range from 1982 to 1986, only 18% of forum non conveniens motions
were granted. For the years spanning 1982 to 2007, an average of 41% of forum non conveniens
motions was granted. In 2008, 54% of forum non conveniens motions were granted. Strangely,
only 30% of the forum non conveniens motions were granted in 2007.
109. See infra Part II.H.
110. See, e.g., Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,256 n.23 (1981) ("A dismissal onforum non conveniens grounds is
appropriate when the defendant establishes, first, that the claim can be heard in an available and
adequate alternative forum and, second, that the balance of private and public factors listed in
Gulf Oil, reveals that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the
defendant or the court." (citation omitted)); Jackson v. Am. Univ. in Cairo, 52 F. App'x 518,
518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Piper,454 U.S. at 241) ("A court first determines whether there is
an adequate alternative forum and, if so, then proceeds to balance both private interest factors
and public interest factors in favor of the respective forums."); Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236
F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22,257; GulfOil, 330 U.S.
at 507-09); Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir.
1991) ("A party moving to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens must show two things:
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existence of an AAF. However, those circuits do not agree on the definition of the
prongs used to test the existence of an AAF.
The Second Circuit considers the
degree of deference given to the plaintiff's choice of forum prior to applying the Piper
threshold AAF consideration. 112 The Tenth Circuit also designates two threshold forum
non conveniens issues: whether there is an alternative forum where the defendant is
amenable to process and whether foreign law applies.1 3 Clearly, the Piper test is the
subject of wide interpretation.
Although every circuit recognizes that the existence of an AAF is a critical
component of forum non conveniens analysis, 38% of circuit court cases and 31% of
all cases in the data set bypassed any consideration of AAF. Some appellate courts
affirm or deny forum non conveniens decisions on the basis of the record below,
including the lower court's AAF analysis, without further analysis or discussion.ll4 Still
other appellate courts bypass review of the lower court's AAF analysis, moving
directly to a review of the deference given the plaintiff's choice of forum and the
balancing of private and public factors."' Lower courts bypass AAF review for a
variety of reasons, 16most notably skipping over AAF in favor ofbalancing the private
(1) the existence of an adequate alternative forum, and (2) that the balance of private and public
interest factors favors dismissal."); DeShane v. Deere & Co., 726 F.2d 443,445 (8th Cir. 1984)
(analyzing the Gulf Oil factors and Piperrules in vacating and remanding the judgment to the
district court).
111. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank P.L.C. v. N. Fox Shipping N.V., 242 F. App'x 84,90 (4th Cir.
2007) ("The existence of an alternative forum depends on two factors: availability and
adequacy."); DTEX, L.L.C. v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 508 F.3d 785, 794 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that in determining whether alternative forum exists, court must consider "the
amenability of the defendant to service of process and availability of an adequate remedy in the
alternative forum"); In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 484 F.3d 951,
954-59 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that an AAF is adequate if the alternative forum provides an
adequate remedy and an AAF is available if all parties are amenable to service of process); Leon
v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("Availability and adequacy warrant
separate consideration."); Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000)
(identifying the two prongs of the AAF test as (1) the alternative forum permits litigation of the
subject matter and (2) the defendant is amenable to service of process).
112. See, e.g., Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indust., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 153, 157 (2d Cir.
2005) ("At step one [of the forum non conveniens analysis], a court determines the degree of
deference properly accorded the plaintiff's choice of forum.").
113. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418,426 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Gschwind v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998)).
114. A typical case is Meisel v. Ustaoglu, 5 F. App'x 206, 206 (4th Cir. 2001) ("We have
reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,
we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.").
115. See, e.g., U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749(7th Cir. 2008); Sys. Div.,
Inc. v. Teknek Elecs., Ltd., 253 F. App'x 31,37-38 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Gilstrap v. Radianz, Ltd.,
233 F. App'x 83, 84 (2d Cir. 2007).
116. See, e.g., Wexco Indus. v. ADM21 Co., No. 04-5244(JLL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
104766, at *55-57 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2008) (bypassing AAF review due to forum-selection
clause); Kilma v. Carnival Corp., No. 08-80335-CIV-MOORE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85138,
at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2008) (denying forum non conveniens based on presumption given
plaintiff's choice of forum); Seatrek Transp. P.T.E., Ltd. v. Regalindo Res. P.T.E., Ltd., 08 Civ.
55 I(LAP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30578, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (denying forum non
conveniens on the basis of maritime law).
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and public factors.' 17 The handling of the AAF inquiry-particularly at the trial court
level-again demonstrates the extent to which the current forum non conveniens
inquiry needs revision and a clearer delineation of each step of the two-part inquiry.
Courts sometimes bypass AAF decisions by "assuming" that the AAF is
adequate." 8 In an extreme example, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy,Inc.,'19 a district court considered the defendant's arguments that Canada was
an adequate forum to hear the plaintiffs' genocide claims, "assum[ing], without
deciding, that plaintiffs would be able to receive a fair trial in Canada, notwithstanding
the fact that Talisman is a Canadian company.' 120 Although the court expressed
reservations about whether a Canadian forum could provide adequate redress for the
plaintiffs' claims, the court did not find that the defendant had failed to prove the
existence of an AAF. Instead, relying on the plaintiffs' failure to challenge the
adequacy of the AAF (effectively shifting the burden to the plaintiffs), the court
assumed1 "without so deciding, that Canadian courts would be adequate alternative
fora.

, 12

Other courts consider AAF without any meaningful review or analysis.1 22 A typical
example is State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. InversionesErrazuriz,Limitada 23 where,
because the plaintiff failed to challenge the adequacy of Chile as an alternative forum,
the court noted that "the real question is which forum do the public and private factors
24
favor, bearing in mind the proper deference to plaintiff's preference for New York."'
125
In Technology Development Co. v. Onischenko, the Third Circuit chastised the
limited AAF review conducted by the lower court and reversed forum non conveniens
dismissal:

117. See, e.g., Neuralstem, Inc. v. Reneuron, Ltd., No. CV08-02168 R (AGRx), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75073, at *2-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008); Steinberg v. Barclay's Nominees

(Branches) Ltd., No. 04-60897-CIV-MARRA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89494, at *12-13 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 5,2007); First Integrity Bank, N.A. v. Gempeler, No. 07-1434(DWF/RLE), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86721, at *6-14 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2007).
118. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 466 F.

Supp. 2d 163, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Even assuming that the BVI is an adequate forum, the
public and private interest factors weigh in favor of this district."); Int'l Equity Invs., Inc. v.
Cico, 427 F. Supp. 2d 503,505 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he Court assumes that Brazil provides an
adequate alternative forum.").
119. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120. Id. at 336-37.
121. Id. at 337-38. The court ultimately denied forum non conveniens on the basis of the

balancing of the private and public factors. See id at 341.
122. See, e.g., Zim Integrated Shipping Servs., Ltd. v. Belco Res., Inc., 07 Civ. 5861(RMB),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36547, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 2,2008) (denying forum non conveniens
by noting "China may not (entirely) be an adequate alternative forum"); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Acer, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-1 03-CE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25952, at *8-10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2008).
123. 230 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

124. Id. at 319-20; see also Cent. Principal Dwelling Bd. of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Fed'n v. N.H. Ins. Co., 904 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("New Hampshire
argues that Finland is an adequate alternative forum for resolution of this case; Ministry of
Defense does not challenge that contention.").
125. 174 F. App'x 117 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Inadequacy of the alternative forum is rarely a barrier toforum non conveniens
dismissal. Nonetheless, we believe the District Court should have done more than
simply conclude that Russia provides an adequate forum without any discussion
whatsoever of the remedies available in Russia or any citation to cases supporting
126
the view that the Russian courts are adequate to handle disputes of this nature.
The district court did no more than make a conclusory statement that "well
established" case law demonstrated the adequacy of the Russian courts for commercial
and tort law cases. It may well be that a proper analysis will reveal that Russia is an
adequate alternative forum, but where a plaintiffprotests the alternative jurisdiction's
adequacy both before the district court and on appeal, the attack is not patently
specious, and the defendant offers minimal evidence in support of adequacy, dismissal
without a reasonably detailed discussion is an abuse of discretion.127
Still other courts consider the private and public factors prior to conducting an AAF
analysis. 128 As lower courts struggle to apply the two-part Piper inquiry, they often
blend the AAF test into the balancing of private and public factors
that should take
129
place only after the court has established that an AAF exists.
In sum, the data reveals that courts do not apply uniform AAF standards. The
uncertainty over the AAF test makes it difficult for parties to predict how courts will
handle forum non conveniens motions. A new test for an AAF would offer greater
predictability for parties and would make courts more accountable for rulings, since
courts conduct procedural forum non conveniens inquiries that often have substantive
effects on cases.

II. A NEW TEST FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM
What makes an alternative forum available to a plaintiff? This question, often
overlooked by federal courts applying the forum non conveniens test, lies at the heart
of whether it is reasonable to dismiss a case on this basis. As a review of the cases has
demonstrated, the Supreme Court's dictate in Piperhas proven too amorphous, leaving

126. Onischenko, 174 F. App'x at 120 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 120. But see Lonyv. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &Co., 886 F.2d 628,633 (3d Cir.
1989) (finding no reversible error where lower court "did seem to look to the plaintiff to show
that the alternative forum was not adequate, rather than looking to the defendant to show that it
was adequate" and defendant "did put forward some evidence on the adequacy ofthe alternative
forum"). For an example of a court conducting a detailed AAF analysis with an improper focus,
see Morales v. FordMotor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674-76 (S.D. Tex. 2004), where the court
devotes more attention to disparaging the plaintiff than to evaluating the adequacy of the
alternative forum.
128. See, e.g., Int'l Equity Inv., Inc. v. Cico, 427 F. Supp. 2d 503,506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen Rania Al-Abdullah, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277, 300-02
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
129. See, e.g., DiChiara v. Ample Faith Invs., Ltd., 06 Civ. 3838(DLC), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85972, at *18-20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2006); Siddi v. Ozark Aircraft Sys., L.L.C.,Nos.
05-5170,05-5206,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84882, at *18 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 21,2006); Zinsler v.
Marriott Corp., 605 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (D. Md. 1985).
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lower courts struggling to comply.' 30 The time has come for a new, clearer test for an
AAF.
An obvious starting point for the new AAF test would be the Supreme Court's test
in Piper. There, the Court stated that "[a]t the outset of any forum non conveniens
inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum."'' The
Pipertest, while "[o]rdinarily... satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to process'
in the other jurisdiction," will in some cases require the court to hold differently if "the
remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory ....

[f]or example...

where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the
dispute."'1 32 Indeed, Piperpurports to offer a complete AAF test. So why not simply
stick with that test? The reason is simple enough: lower courts have found the test
confusing in application, resulting in inconsistency.
A new test is needed to resolve the inconsistencies, one that incorporates the ideas
in the Piper test but identifies the meaningful lines of inquiry for courts to explore
when deciding whether an alternative forum exists.
In thinking about what constitutes an alternative forum, any test must start by
considering a basic question: alternative to what? Of course, in an American forum non
conveniens analysis in federal court, the answer is an American federal district court.
What then are the features of an American federal district court that provide the lowest
common denominator of acceptable justice in an alternative forum? 133 This Article
suggests that these features include the following: jurisdiction, meaningful remedy, fair
treatment of parties, access to the courts, procedural due process, and stability of the
forum. If these are the factors that an American court expects in itself, then it stands to
reason that any alternative forum should provide the same features.
With those expectations in mind, this Article proposes a six-factor test for
determining whether an alternative forum is available. 34 Each factor, like the entire
analysis for forum non conveniens, should be evaluated with the burden of persuasion
on the party moving for the forum non conveniens dismissal. 35 The factors courts

130. See Elizabeth T. Lear, NationalInterests, Foreign Injuries, and FederalForum Non

Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 559, 602-03 (2007) (arguing that "[flederal forum non
conveniens decisions appear to depend more on the individual biases of district court judges
than any identifiable legal standard"); see also Julius Jurianto, ForumNon Conveniens:Another
Look at ConditionalDismissals,83 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 369, 382-87 (2006) (discussing the
confusion in lower courts that resulted from Piper).
131. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,254 n.22 (1981).
132. Id.(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947), superseded by

statute, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)).
133. The notion of securing justice has been a longstanding principle of the forum non
conveniens inquiry, dating back to 1947 when, in a case decided in the same term as GulfOil,
the Court made it clear that forum non conveniens dismissals would be appropriate if dismissals
would "best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." Koster v. (Am.)
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947).
134. To the extent possible, the test proposed herein draws on the considerations and
language used by federal courts over the past twenty-five years in analyzing motions to dismiss
on the basis of forum non conveniens.
135. As a general rule, the defendant will be the party making the motion to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds, though the defendant is not always the moving party if
counterclaims or cross-claims are filed.
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should consider are: (1) whether all defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of F2
according to the law of F2; (2) whether F2 provides a meaningful remedy; (3) whether
the plaintiff will be treated fairly in F2; (4) whether all plaintiffs have practical access
to the courts of F2; (5) whether F2 provides procedural due process; and (6) whether
F2 is a stable forum. If the court hearing the forum non conveniens motion determines
that any one of the 36six factors is not true for F2, then it should find the alternative
forum unavailable. 1

A. FactorOne: Whether All Defendants Are Subject to the Jurisdictionof Forum
Two According to the Law of Forum Two
When asking whether an AAF exists, the first step is to find out whether all of the
defendants who appear before the court would be amenable to jurisdiction in F2.
Courts frequently articulate this consideration as a question
of whether the defendant is
13 7
amenable to service of process or some similar variant.

136. Each factor includes a checklist of considerations that courts should bear in mind when
evaluating any given factor. Unlike the factors, these considerations are intended as a guide for
courts; if one or more considerations pose a problem with F2, a court in F 1, looking at all of the
considerations for that factor, might still conclude that F2 is available. By contrast, if a court
does conclude that one of the factors poses a problem in terms of the availability of F2, then that
forum should not be deemed available, and the court should deny the motion without even
engaging in the balancing of private and public interests.
137. See Fidelity Bank P.L.C. v. N. Fox Shipping N.V., 242 F. App'x 84,90 (4th Cir. 2007)
("'Ordinarily, [the availability] requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to
process' in the [foreign] jurisdiction."' (quoting Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22) (alterations in
original)); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The

doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes at least two forums where the defendant is
amendable to process.") (quoting Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 341
(5th Cir. 1999))); Copitas v. Fishing Vessel Alexandros, 20 F. App'x 744, 746 (9th Cir. 2001)
("At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there

exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is

'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction. This threshold test is met here because
Defendants have signed a letter indicating that they will submit to in rem and in personam
jurisdiction in Papua New Guinea." (quoting Piper,454 U.S. 254 n.22)); PT United Can Co. v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) ("First.... a court must satisfy itself
that the litigation may be conducted elsewhere against all defendants."); Prasad v. Pepsico Inc.,
Nos. 95-55666, 95-55669, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29092, at *5 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996); Tyco
Fire & Sec. v. Alcocer, No. 04-23127-CIV-COOKE/BANDSTRA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71997, at *3 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2008) (citing Tyco Fire & Sec., L.L.C. v. Alcocer, 218 F.
App'x 860, 864 (11 th Cir. 2007)) ("A defendant can demonstrate that the alternative forum is
available by either showing that it is amenable to service of process in that forum, or
alternatively, by consenting to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum."); Lisenbee v. FedEx
Corp., 579 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1004 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) ("[A] case should only be dismissed under
forum non conveniens if the alternative, foreign forum has jurisdiction to hear the case. Usually,
this requirement is satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the foreign
jurisdiction." (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241, 254 n.22)); Estate of Miller v. Toyota Motor
Corp., No. 6:07-cv-1358-Orl-19DAB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92640, at *15, *17 n.5 (M.D.
Fla., Dec. 18, 2007) (holding and following "Eleventh Circuit's case law [that] requires an
explicit finding that the defendant is either 'amenable to process' in the alternative forum or
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As the Court in Pipernoted: "[o]rdinarily, th[e] requirement [that an AAF exists]
will be satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other
jurisdiction."'138 Remarkably, some courts treat this factor as the only requirement in
determining whether an alternative forum exists.' 39 These courts are mistaken; while

willing to consent to jurisdiction there"); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, No. 06 Civ.
11512(DLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58195, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007) (citing Piper,
454 U.S. at 254 n.22) ("A forum is generally adequate if defendants are amenable to service of
process there .... ); Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725 (E.D. La. 2002)
("'The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes at least two forums where the defendant
is amenable to process .... .- (quoting Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331,
341 (5th Cir. 1999)).
138. Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07
(1947), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (2006)).
139. See R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991)
("Ordinarily a foreign forum will be adequate when the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction
of that forum. Since [defendant] has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the [alternative
forum's] courts as a condition of dismissal, and [the plaintiff] . .. has not claimed that the
[alternative forum's] courts are otherwise inadequate, the district court did not err in concluding
that the [alternative forum] was an adequate forum. The central focus of this appeal is therefore
whether the district court correctly balanced the relevant private and public interests in
dismissing the case." (citations omitted)); Alpine Atl. Asset Mgmt. v. Comstock, 552 F. Supp.
2d 1268, 1276 (D. Kan. 2008); Fish & Neave v. Perovetz, No. 91 Civ. 7047(CSH), 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20228, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1992) (citing Piper,454 U.S. at 254 n.22) ("As a
threshold matter, an adequate alternative forum may be demonstrated by defendant's willingness
to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court.... [T]he only defendant in this action following
the entry of default against the corporate defendants, has expressed his willingness to submit to
courts of the [alternate forum], and to waive any statute of limitations defenses should [the
plaintiff] pursue the action there. Thus, the analysis may turn to the balance of public and
private factors, as outlined by Gulf"); Lo v. Amsterdam & Sauer, Ltd., No. 91 Civ. 4389(PKL),
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13395, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1992) ("'Ordinarily, a foreign forum
will be adequate when the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of that forum.' In the instant
action, it is not clear whether Defendant would be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of [the
alternate forum]. Thus, if the Court does grant Defendant's motion to dismiss, it will condition
the grant on Defendant's agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of [the alternate
forum], as well as on Defendant's agreeing to waive any statute of limitations defense that has
arisen since the date on which Plaintiffs commenced this action in this Court. Because Plaintiffs
do not otherwise argue that [the alternate forum] would not provide an adequate forum for this
litigation, the Court will proceed to consider the relevant private and public interest factors."
(quoting Maganlal,942 F.2d at 164) (citation omitted)); Bank of Crete, S.A. v. Koskotas, No.
88 CIV. 8412(KMW), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18586, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1991) ("A
threshold question in forum non conveniens analysis is whether there exists an adequate
alternate forum. Ordinarily, a foreign forum will be adequate when the defendant is subject to
the jurisdiction of that forum. [The defendant] is a resident of [the alternate forum] and has
already been sued in [the alternate forum's] courts. The central focus here is therefore the
balance of private and public interests." (citations omitted)); Postol v. El-Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.,
690 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("A preliminary consideration necessary in aforum
non conveniens motion is whether an alternative forum exists.... In this case against El Al
another forum does exist. The defendants may be sued in Israel. El Al is a corporation wholly
owned by the State of Israel and amenable to process in an Israeli court.").
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0
jurisdiction is an element of basic justice, it is not the only element.14
Defendants sometimes offer to waive jurisdictional objections in F2 as a way of
encouraging the court to dismiss the case.' 41 This waiver only matters when F2 will
give effect to the waiver ofjurisdictional defenses by the defendants. Furthermore, this
waiver operates to create a couple of interesting anomalies in a post-Sinochem world.
First, by enforcing this waiver against the defendants, the court may end up making a
foreign jurisdictional inquiry even before making a domestic inquiry. Second, as the
Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Sinochem, a defendant who waives
jurisdictional objections in F2 as a condition of dismissal in F I may also be implicitly
waiving any personal jurisdiction defenses it may have had in FL (in the event that the

case returns to F 1).142

140. This focus on amenability to service of process also simplifies the jurisdictional
inquiry-at least in American terms. Whereas service of process can operate as a waiver of
personal jurisdictional objections, federal courts still must have an independent basis for subject
matter jurisdiction. Similarly, foreign forums may have their own rules on subject matter
jurisdiction or an equivalent concept that cannot be waived through service of process.
141. See Fatkhiboyanovich v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 04-4333, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23414, *4-5 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2005) (finding defendant met burden to prove there was AAF by
voluntarily submitting to jurisdiction in F2 and waiving any statute of limitation defenses that
defendant may have in F2); Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 896 F. Supp. 1197, 1200-01 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (discussing concessions du Pont agreed to
in order to facilitate forum non conveniens dismissal, which included submitting to jurisdiction
of foreign tribunal, being bound to pay judgments against it rendered by such foreign tribunal,
allowing the time the case was in Florida court to be excluded from any statute of limitations
calculations, and making documents in du Pont depository in Delaware available to plaintiffs as
if plaintiffs were domestic litigants). Notice, too, that this type of voluntary submission does
raise concerns about forum shopping by defendants, particularly when a defendant is in its place
of domicile or incorporation.
142. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,435 (2007) (citing
Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349,363 n.21 (3d Cir. 2006), revd
by Sinochem, 549 U.S. 422 (2007) ("The Third Circuit expressed the fiurther concern that a
court failing first to establish its jurisdiction could not condition a forum non conveniens
dismissal on the defendant's waiver of any statute of limitations defense or objection to the
foreign forum's jurisdiction. Unable so to condition a dismissal, the Court of Appeals feared, a
court could not shield the plaintiff against a foreign tribunal's refusal to entertain the suit."). The
Court then pointed out that, with a case already pending in China with all jurisdictional issues
already decided, "We therefore need not decide whether a court conditioning a forum non
conveniens dismissal on the waiver ofjurisdictional or limitations defenses in the foreign forum
must first determine its own authority to adjudicate the case." Id. Thus, if a court, guided by
Sinochem, decides it would be more expedient to decide the forum non conveniens motion
before determining jurisdiction, a problem might arise if the court's dismissal is contingent upon
the defendant agreeing to one or more conditions. By agreeing to these conditions, the defendant
may arguably be recognizing the court's power over it, thereby waiving any future personal
jurisdiction objection in the event that the case returns to FI for any reason. Given the number
of courts that issue conditional dismissals, this concern is not merely theoretical and defendants
should be aware of the risk they face when agreeing to conditional forum non conveniens
dismissals before a court has adjudicated any personal jurisdiction objections raised by the same
defendants.

2010]

RETHINKING THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS ANALYSIS

1085

Courts often consider that the defendant's voluntary submission to F2's jurisdiction
can satisfy this factor. 143 Some courts say that voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
in F2 is sufficient to satisfy the entire AAF test but go on to analyze the availability of
the forum nonetheless.144 By contrast, other courts recognize that the parties' voluntary
submission may be irrelevant or insufficient according to F2's law. 45 For a court to

143. See Tyco Fire & Sec. v. Alcocer, No. 04-2317-CIV-COOKE/BANDSTRA, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71997, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2008) ("The first step is to determine 'whether an
adequate alternative forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case.' To succeed
on this point, the defendant must show that the proposed alternative forum is both available and
adequate. A defendant can demonstrate that the alternative forum is available by either showing
that it is amenable to service of process in that forum, or alternatively, by consenting to the
jurisdiction of the alternative forum." (quoting Tyco Fire & Sec. v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x 860,
864-65 (11 th Cir. 2007)); Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 424, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) ("Defendants suggest that [the alternate forum] is an adequate alternative forum, and I
agree with them. There has been some suggestion that because of the Singh Sahni family's
power in [the alternate forum], it would be difficult, or even impossible, to secure witnesses
willing to testify. However, as I recently pointed out, I am loath to impugn the integrity or
efficacy of the courts of a foreign jurisdiction."); Estate of Madison Miller v. Toyota Motor
Corp., No. 6:07-cv-1358-Orl- 19DAB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92640, at *15, *17 n.5 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 18, 2007) ("A party seeking dismissal under forum non conveniens may meet this
requirement by showing (1) that it is amenable to service in the alternative forum or by (2)
consenting to jurisdiction in the alternative forum."); Gonzales v. P.T. Pelangi Niagra Mitra
Int'l, 196 F. Supp. 2d 482,486 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("An agreement by the defendants to submit to
the jurisdiction of the foreign forum satisfies [the available forum] requirement.").
144. See, e.g., Robert v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-1576-L, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7232, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2002) ("The Court finds that Ontario, Canada is an
'available' forum within the meaning of this test. All defendants have agreed to submit to the
personal jurisdiction of an appropriate Canadian court and waive any statute of limitations
defense that might apply. This concession renders Ontario available for purposes of aforum non
conveniens analysis" but nonetheless following that very sentence by analyzing other questions
to confirm that Ontario was both "adequate" and "available." (citations omitted)).
145. See Copitas v. Fishing Vessel Alexandros, 20 F. App'x 744, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001)
("We understand the dismissal to be dependent upon the PNG court actually accepting
jurisdiction, rather than the Defendants merely submitting to the jurisdiction of PNG.
Defendants in their brief have assured us that this is the case. Thus, if the PNG court does not
assume jurisdiction over the case for any reason, the Plaintiffs will be free to refile in Guam,
because the conditions of the district court's dismissal will not have been satisfied." (emphasis
in original)); Heriot v. Byrne, No. 08 C 2272, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60600, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
July 21,2008) (acknowledging plaintiff's arguments regarding the Federal Court ofAustralia's
ability to accept the defendants' consent to that court's jurisdiction); Sacks v. Four Seasons
Hotel, Ltd., No. 5:04CV73, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768, at *20 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2006)
("[A] Mexican court lacks territorial jurisdiction over Canadian defendant.... According to Mr.
Dahl and Professor Pereznieto, Article 30, Section IV of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
State of Nayarit, determines that jurisdiction in a personal action lies in the defendant's
domicile. When a defendant is not domiciled in a particular judge's jurisdiction, the Mexican
judge will declare himself without jurisdiction and must refuse to accept or admit the case into
his court."); Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (E.D. La. 2002) ("Under
[the relevant Costa Rican laws], one looks first for jurisdiction in the place where the parties
have submitted themselves to jurisdiction, although consent alone is not enough to create
jurisdiction .... "); Machline v. Nat'l Helicopters, No. 94 Civ. 8456(LBS), 1995 U.S. Dist.
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rely on the voluntary submission of a party, it must ensure that such submission will be
effective in F2 under F2's law. 46
Still other courts contend that the problem ofjurisdiction can be resolved through a
conditional dismissal.1 47 In Borija v. Dole FoodCo., the district court in the Northern
District of Texas concluded that:
[R]ather than making an extensive inquiry into Costa Rica's jurisdiction law
[regarding whether the parties' voluntary submission to Costa Rica's jurisdiction
suffices to establish such jurisdiction] at this juncture, the court assumes for
purposes of this analysis that Costa8 Rica is available if forum non conveniens
dismissal is conditionally granted.14
The court thus reduced its
49 own expectations for jurisdictional proof by
conditioning its dismissal.
This factor should not be influenced by a court's determination of whether all
defendants can be sued in a single action in F2. Courts have been split on what effect
this consideration should have on the availability of F2.150 So long as the plaintiff can
LEXIS 5650, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1995) ("Grave doubt exists whether a Brazilian court
would accept jurisdiction [under Brazilian law], even on consent of the parties .. ").
146. Courts may need to seek additional briefing by parties in order to establish the law of
F2 on this question.
147. See Jurianto, supra note 130, at 399-402 (arguing that, while it is counterintuitive for a
court to be able to create an adequate alternative forum by conditioning the dismissal, lower
courts often use conditional dismissals for precisely that purpose); see also, e.g., Henderson v.
Metro. Bank &Trust Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing conditions that
can be placed upon forum non conveniens dismissals); Boskoff v. Transportes Aeroes
Portugueses, Nos. 79 C 4771, 74 C 4772, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16547, at *13 (N.D. I11.1983)
(dismissing on forum non conveniens where defendant voluntarily submitted to "Americanstyle" discovery rules).
148. Borja v. Dole Food Co., No. 3:97-CV-308-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23234, at *13
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2002).
149. See Bies, supra note 29, at 501-03 (arguing conditional dismissals are intended to
ensure that alternate forum is indeed adequate and that conditions typically involve requirements
that alternative forum accept case, that defendant submit to jurisdiction of F2, or that defendant
submit to enforceability of any final judgments); Jurianto, supra note 130 at 399-402
(discussing conditional dismissals as a solution to jurisdiction and arguing that by conditioning
dismissals upon defendant submitting to jurisdiction in F2, court in FI is attempting to ensure
that any judgment in F2 can be enforced in Fl). However, this approach, adopted prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Sinochem, is far more complex and problematic. After Sinochem,
the now-clear option of ruling on a forum non conveniens motion in advance of establishing the
court's jurisdiction might in fact lead to unanticipated consequences. For example, in a case
where the court decided the forum non conveniens motion prior to ruling on personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, the conditional dismissal might mean that, should jurisdiction in
F2 (say, Costa Rica) fail, the case will return to F l (Texas)--now with the defendant having
waived any jurisdictional objections it may have had. While such an outcome is not certain
given the current state of the law, it is nonetheless a plausible outcome. If the Supreme Court
ultimately rules on this question (thus far explicitly left unanswered) and holds that defendants
might be waiving later jurisdictional defenses, then perhaps conditional dismissals should be
disfavored.
150. See In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., On Oct. 31, 1999, No. 00-MDL1344,2004 US Dist. LEXIS 16085, at *20-21 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,2004) (holding that Canada
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sue some of the defendants in F2, F2 can be deemed available for those defendants. To
the extent that courts are to be guided by practical questions about whether a forum is
available, the fact that F2 would have power over some but not all defendants does not
in itself render F2 unavailable. Such a finding would not bar the litigation from moving
forward-it simply may make the litigation less convenient for the plaintiff.
Courts should be given flexibility to use their best judgment about whether-and
when-splitting a case will lead to the intended benefits of forum non conveniens.
Above all, it is important to remember that (a) this factor is just one of many in the
AAF inquiry (and so other factors may lead to a finding that F2 is unavailable as to all
defendants anyway), and (b) even if the court determines that an AAF exists for some
defendants, it still must engage in the second prong of the forum non conveniens
analysis, weighing the private and public interests. The risk of a race to judgment is
precisely the kind of concern courts should consider in the analysis of the public
interests.
In sum, factor one of the AAF test will be satisfied only when the court in F1
concludes that the courts of F2 will have jurisdiction over any defendants who will be
dismissed if the forum non conveniens motion is granted.' 51 A defendant can offer to
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of F2, but the court in FL must ensure that such
submission will be effective in F2 under F2's law. Finally, where jurisdiction would be
proper in F2, this factor alone does not meet the entire AAF test. After finding proper
jurisdiction in F2, a court should turn then to all of the other factors as well to be
certain that F2 is truly available.
B. Factor Two: Whether Forum Two Provides a Meaningful Remedy
The Supreme Court in Piperinstructed that courts should consider as one factor in
the test for an AAF whether "the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.' 52 This occurs, for example,
had not been shown to be an AAF, in part because Canadian law required filing suit against
different defendants in different courts when such cases could not be consolidated); cf
Monsanto Int'l Sales Co. v. Hanjin Container Lines, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 832, 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (affirming magistrate judge's determination that Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan are all
AAFs regarding at least one defendant, even though magistrate's ruling "permitted the
possibility that not all of the claims involved in this litigation will end up in one single forum").
But see PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork& Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[I]n
order to grant a motion to dismiss forforum non conveniens, a court must satisfy itself that the
litigation may be conducted elsewhere against all defendants."); Watson v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
769 F.2d 354,357 (6th Cir. 1985); Lisenbee v. FedEx Corp., No. 3:06-cv-1 159,2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86576, at *31 (M.D. Tenn., Aug. 14, 2008).
151. See Giaguaro S.p.A. v. Amiglio, 257 F. Supp. 2d 529, 537 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (observing
that defendants cannot escape to forums they know to be unavailable, "[h]ere, plaintiffs literally
have no alternative forum other than to adjudicate before this court. Indeed, the Canadian Court
of Appeal has already decided that no jurisdiction exists over Francoise with regard to the
issuance of the non-valid checks. Having successfully obtained a dismissal of plaintiffs' case in
the Canadian court, defendant now argues that Canada is a more appropriate forum in which to
adjudicate these issues. Defendant cannot have it both ways.").
152. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,254 (1981). For a sampling of courts that
have adopted this test in their analysis, see Tennecal Funding Corp. v. Sakura Bank, No. 9456515, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544, at *4-5 (9th Cir. June 19, 1996); Tyco Fire & Sec. v.
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"where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the
dispute." ' 53 To understand the Piper instruction, courts need to know what concerns
would cause the alternative forum to be deemed sufficiently inadequate or
unsatisfactory so as to constitute no remedy at all. As the survey of circuit law
discussed above' 54 indicates, lower courts have had difficulty interpreting Piper'stest;
the test needs to be further refined so that it can be more uniformly and accurately
applied.
One consideration for courts should be whether the statute of limitations has run in
F2.155 Many courts address statute of limitations concerns as something that the
defendant can waive as a condition of granting a forum non conveniens motion. 5'But
Alcocer, No. 04-2317-CIV-COOKE/BANDSTRA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71997, at *4 (S.D.
Fla., Sept. 23, 2008); Lisenbee v. FedEx Corp., No. 3:06-cv- 1159, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86576, at *29-30 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14,2008); RSMProduction Corp.v. Fridman,No. 06 Civ.
S1512(DLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58195, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007).
153. Piper,454 U.S. at 255 n.22.

154. See supra notes 110-29 and accompanying text.
155. For a sampling of courts that have adopted the statute of limitations test in their
analysis, see Tennecal Funding,. 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544, at *4-5; Tyco Fire & Sec.,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71997, at *4; Lisenbee, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86576, at *29-30; RSM
ProductionCorp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58195, at *16-17; Malewicz v. City ofAmsterdam,
517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 340 (D.D.C. 2007); Sacks v. Four Seasons Hotel Ltd., No. 5:04CV73,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2006). For more discussion on this
point, see Bies, supranote 29, at 501-02; Jurianto, supra note 130, at 399-402; Monroe Leigh,
Forum Non Conveniens-Conditional Dismissal of Tort Claim by Foreign Plaintiffs, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 964, 964-65 (1986). See also Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co., 745 F.2d 312, 316 (4th
Cir. 1984) (holding that neither Australia nor Canada were AAFs because the movant failed to

meet the burden of proof, in part because movant did not show "that no statute of limitations in
[the proposed alternative forum] renders that [forum] ineligible ....
");
Omollo v. Citibank,
N.A., No. 07 Civ. 9259(SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36917, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008)
(holding that because there was equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in F2 it was
"available as an alternative forum"); Ndunguru v. Kone, Inc., No. 8:07CV286, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3428, at *6-7 (D.Neb. Jan. 2, 2008) (holding AAF statute of limitations prohibits the
litigation); Lang v. Corporacion de Hoteles, S.A., 522 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357 (D. P.R. 2007)
("[T]he forum is not adequate if the applicable statute of limitations would bar litigation in that
forum."); Beana v. Woori Bank, No. 05 Civ. 7018 (PKC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74549, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2006) (finding no AAF due to statute of limitations); De Shazo v. Nations
Energy Co., No. H-05-3277, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68611, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006)
(same); Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 269 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding
prescription in AAF is absolute bar to litigation).

156. See Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission of Japan, 930 F.2d 764,768 (9th
Cir. 1991); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Constab Polymer-Chemie GmbH & Co., No. 5:01-CV0882(NAM)(GJD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72873, at *41 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,2007) (granting,
conditionally, the forum non conveniens claim on the conditions that the defendant waived "any
statute of limitations defense(s) available under [the AAF's] law" and consented "to plaintiff's
restitution of the lawsuit" in the current court if the AAF court does "not recognize the
plaintiff's cause of action or decline[s] to adjudicate the case"); Clough v. Perenco, L.L.C., No.
H-05-3713, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61198, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2007) ("[T]he court may
condition its dismissal to allow [the plaintiff] to reinstate his suit here should [the defendant]
attempt to use a statute of limitations defense in [the alternate forum]."); Robert v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 3-01 -CV-1 576-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7232, at *10 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 23, 2002).
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other courts recognize that the statute of limitations cannot always be waived under
F2's law.' 57 Ultimately, before conditioning dismissal on a waiver of statute of
limitations objections, as with waivers ofjurisdictional defenses considered in factor
one, courts should be certain that the statute of limitations can indeed be waived under
the law of F2.158
A second consideration for courts, when analyzing this factor, is whether F2
recognizes the plaintiff's claim. This consideration often involves an analysis of
whether the plaintiff is suing under United States statutory law (e.g., RICO, trademark,
or copyright law) that may vary considerably in F2 or that may not exist as a claim
there at all. 159 Where a change in substantive law will occur, courts should include this
consideration in their analysis of factor two.

157. Lake, 538 F. Supp. at 262 (holding that Quebec was not AAF because of expired oneyear prescription under Quebec law on bringing type of actions plaintiff desired, because "[lthe
prescription in Quebec is not in the nature of a statute of limitations, which procedurally bars a
remedy and can be waived by the party who could use it as a defense. It is an absolute
substantive bar to a cause of action that a court must invoke even if the defendant does not raise
it as a defense"); Lisenbee v. FedEx Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86576, at *32 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 14, 2008) (holding that Germany was not AAF because "[i]t appears that [under the
relevant German statute] plaintiff would only be able to receive compensation and damages
from [defendant] ifhe asserted his claims of adverse treatment in writing within two months of
obtainingknowledge ofsuch treatment"(emphasisin original)) ; Sacks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17768, at * 18 ("First, Defendants' waiver agreement cannot overcome the Mexican statute of
limitations which has expired. Under the Civil Code for the State of Nayarit Article 1145, the
statute of limitations for this case is two years. The decedent died on June 8, 2003, and Plaintiffs
would have had to file in the proper Nayarit court by June of 2005 to have a cause of action in
Mexico. Because Plaintiffs did not file a lawsuit in Nayarit by June of 2005, the applicable
statute of limitations in Mexico has expired. Plaintiffs persuasively argue Defendants improperly
assert the expired two-year statute of limitations in this case would be tolled. According to
Plaintiffs, Nayarit's tolling statute only applies to lawsuits filed within the territories of
Mexico.").
158. This is another area where courts should be encouraged to solicit additional briefing
from the parties, at least where the court is inclined to condition its dismissal on a waiver of the

statute of limitations in F2.
159. See Heriot v. Byrne, No. 08 C 2272,2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60600, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill.
Jul. 21,2008) (holding, in a U.S. copyright infringement action, that Australia is not an AAF);
Mecum v. Host Marriott Corp., No. 4:04CV260, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37409, at *8 (E.D.

Tex. Apr. 25, 2005) ("Because the province of Alberta does not recognize a child's claim for
loss of consortium as a result of wrongful injury to the child's parent, the remedy afforded by
that forum would be clearly unsatisfactory."); Greenlight Capital, Inc. v. Greenlight, S.A., No.
04 Civil 3136, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,2005) ("'[T]he courts of this
district have declined to dismiss cases pursuant toforum non conveniens where plaintiff asserts
U.S. trademark or copyright claims."' (quoting Bermudez & Co. v. Bermudez Int'l, No. 99 Civ.
9346,2000 U.S. Dist. 12354, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,2000))); Lemout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.
v. Lernout, 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 176 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding AAF lacked class action
mechanism and did not recognize fraud-on-the-market theory); North Carolina v. Alexander &
Alexander Servs., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (finding England not an AAF because
England has no statute comparable to RICO); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F.
Supp. 811, 817 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding Britain not an AAF because "British courts could not
and would not enforce the American antitrust laws"); cf. Ceramic Corp. v. Inka Mar. Corp., 1
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However, in line with the Supreme Court's clearly expressed position in Piper,a
mere change in substantive law is not dispositive on this factor and does not
automatically make a forum unavailable. 16° For example, in the Third Circuit's
decision in Piper(explicitly reversed by the Supreme Court), the court concluded that
[I]t is apparent that the dismissal would work a change in the applicable law so
that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would be eliminated from the case. But...
a dismissal for forum non conveniens, like a statutory transfer, "should not, despite
its convenience, result in a change in the applicable law." Only when American
law is not applicable, or when the foreign jurisdiction would, as a matter of its own
choice of law, give the plaintiff the161benefit of the claim to which she is entitled
here, would dismissal be justified.
When the Supreme Court stepped in and overruled the Third Circuit, the Court
established that a change in the
applicable law in the event of dismissal would not in
162
itself render F2 unavailable.
While a change in applicable law should not lead to an automatic finding of no
AAF, the considerations described by the Third Circuit in Piper would certainly be
relevant considerations in a court's determination as to whether a meaningful remedy
exists in F2. These considerations must be accounted for as part of this second factor of
the AAF inquiry. 163 In general, the exact claim need not be available, but there must be
F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding plaintiff must show not only that certain U.S. statutory
claims-for example under RICO or the Lanham Act-are unavailable in F2, but also that F2
provides no other possible recovery, for example under a tort or contract theory); Howe v.
Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944,952 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[S]mall differences in standards and
procedural differences (such as greater difficulty in meeting class action requirements or less
generous rules for recovery of attorney's fees) are beside the point."); Kempe v. Ocean Drilling
& Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the absence of RICO
equivalent in the alternate forum is not a problem because there are other remedies available, so
"'although [the defendants'] potential damage award may be smaller, there is no danger they
will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly"'(quoting Piper,454 U.S. at 255)); Lisenbee
v. FedEx Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86576, at *29 ("Although the German law protecting
employees from discrimination is not as developed as that of the United States, a remedy still
exists under the [German law] for a claim of discrimination."); Cortec Corp. v. Erste Bank Ber
Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG (Erste Bank), 535 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that Croatian commercial law controls and that plaintiffs' concerns that Croatia does
not recognize tortious interference with business claims do not render Croatia an inadequate
alternative forum); LaSala v. Bank of Cyprus Pub. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding Cyprus to be AAF although claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing are not recognized by Cypriot courts);
P.H. Int'l Trading Co. v. Christia Confezioni S.p.A., No. 04-C-0903, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22138, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005) ("While it is true that Plaintiff will be unable to
allege a cause of action based on the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act in Italy, it is not clear that Plaintiff has no remedy at all should an Italian court rule in

Plaintiff's favor about Christia's conduct.").
160. Piper,454 U.S. at 247.
161. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149,163-64 (3d. Cir. 1980) (quoting Demateos
v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d. Cir. 1977), rev'd,454 U.S. 235 (1981).
162. Piper,454 U.S. at 247.
163. For a similar view of this factor, see Clermont, supra note 5, at 203.
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an analogous or substitute remedy.164 A consideration that has not often been explored,
but which should be considered as part of this particular line of judicial analysis, is
whether the alternate forum has a system of compensation that accounts for its
universal health-care program, tort recovery, or similar social programs that can
significantly diminish the damage award for an American victim.' Where such a
program is in place, plaintiffs from these countries may have derived benefits from
F2's system in ways incidental to the lawsuit in question. Courts should be able to
factor such benefits into their determination of F2's availability in a particular case.
A third consideration for courts to analyze includes whether there is a remedy
available against all of the defendants in the action and not just some of them.166 In

164. "Analogous" and "substitute" remedies are distinct concepts. Although the existence of
either type of remedy satisfies the "cause of action" consideration, courts should be sure to look
for both types. Database protection law provides an instructive example of the difference
between them. United States copyright law protects databases as "compilations," provided the
arrangement or selection of data is sufficiently original. See JuLIE E. COHEN,

LYDIA

PALLAS

A. O'RouRKE, COPYRIGHT INA GLOnAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 291 (2d ed. 2006). But "legal protection for.., collections or compilations of
information [lacking sufficient originality in arrangement or selection] is still unsettled." Id. at
306. Protection may be available for such "uncopyrightable" databases under state unfair
competition or trade secret laws. Thus, a plaintiff bringing a database-related suit in the United
States might rely on the Copyright Act or state law. Id. Either way, a court considering a forum
non conveniens motion to dismiss in favor of a European Union member nation could find an
"analogous" or a "substitute" cause of action in F2 under the EU Database Directive, Council
Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) (EC), (or related national legislation). The EU Database
Directive "establishes a two-tier system of protection for databases." COHEN ET AL., supra,at
305. First, the Directive demands copyright-like protection for databases of sufficient
originality. Id. Thus, a plaintiff bringing suit under the U.S. Copyright Act would have an
"analogous" cause of action in F2 under the Directive's first tier. In this case, the remedies
available in the two forums would be very similar. Second, the EU Database Directive provides
sui generis protection for databases that would not be copyrightable in the United States. Id. A
plaintiff relying on a state unfair competition cause of action in the United States would thus
have a "substitute" cause of action in F2 under the Directive's second tier. Here, the available
remedies in the two forums may vary considerably. Nevertheless, F2 would still provide a
remedy, albeit a "substitute" remedy that may be more or less satisfactory to a victorious
plaintiff.
165. See Lear, supra note 130, at 571 (arguing that unlike some countries, "[t]he United
States relies on a private tort compensation system, having rejected those systems that provide
universal healthcare ... to tort victims"). Lear cites as an example the fact that New Zealand
"replaced its private tort compensation scheme with a comprehensive no-fault accident
compensation scheme that barred litigation seeking personal injury damages at common law" Id.
at 571 n.59.
166. See, e.g., Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, La.), 821 F.2d 1147, 1164 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he moving defendant must
establish that an adequate and available forum exists as to all defendants if there are several.");
Lisenbee v. FedEx Corp., No. 3:06-1159, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86576, at *33 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 14, 2008) ("[Wlhile Plaintiff may possibly have an adequate remedy under German law
against FedEx Europe, Plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy under German law against
FedEx."); F.D. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. M/V Reefer Sun, 02 Civ. 2936 (SAS), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10116, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2003) ("This Court is the only forum where the entire
LOREN, RuTH L. OKEDUI & MAUREEN
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Dole FoodCo. v. Watts,167 the plaintiff brought fraud and deceit, conspiracy, breach of
fiduciary duty, and conversion claims against a citizen of the United Kingdom living in
France and a citizen of Germany living in Spain. The Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds at least in part due to concerns over whether any
alternative forum had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over all of the
69
defendants.

16

' The Ninth Circuit in Crystal Co. v. Inchcape ShippingServices, Inc. 1

used the conditional dismissal mechanism to ensure the plaintiff an available remedy
against all defendants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal but
remanded the case for entry of a condition requiring all defendants to agree to accept
the jurisdiction of the alternative forum and waive any statute of limitations
defenses. 170
A fourth consideration for courts involves whether both equitable and legal
remedies are available in F2, where such remedies are sought in the litigation in F .171
If a party is seeking an injunction but injunctive
relief is not available in F2, then F2
172
would not be available to the plaintiff.
A fifth consideration for courts deciding whether F2 offers a meaningful remedy is
whether there would be extreme delay in F2 due to backlog in its courts. 173 Courts
should apply a clear test as to what constitutes extreme delay. Following the lead of the
Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile InsuranceCo. v. Campbell,174 this

case can be tried, thereby avoiding duplicative litigation."); Androutsakos v. M/V Psara, No. 021173-JE, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25520, at *18 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2003) (finding an "inability to
truly consolidate this action into a single case before a single court in Greece"). For additional
discussion on this point and other cases, see Martin Davies, Time to Changethe FederalForum
Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 317-18 (2002); John P. Dobrovich, Jr.,
Dismissal UnderForumNon Conveniens: Should the Availability Requirement be a Threshold
Issue When Applied to Nonessential Defendants, 12 W-DENER L. REv. 561, 576-83 (2006).
167. 303 F.3d 1104(9th Cir. 2002).
168. See id.at 1116-19.

169. 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2002).
170. Id. Before such conditions are imposed, a court should confirm that they will be valid
under the law of F2. See Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB,205 F.3d 208, 221 (5th Cir.
2000) (all four defendants agreed to submit to jurisdiction of alternative forum).
171. Osseiran v. Int'l Fin. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 139, 148-49 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding no
AAF incontract cause of action because equitable remedy of specific performance not available
in F2); NHL Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1164
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that Canada was not AAF, in part because injunctive relief was not
available under Canadian law that was offering only possible cause of action to plaintiffs).
172. Courts looking into this question should be wary of plaintiffs who seek injunctive relief
solely to make an alternative forum. This inquiry should be familiar to courts, which ask similar
questions to ensure that plaintiffs do not seek equitable relief solely to receive a bench rather
than jury trial inthe United States. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,472-73
(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959).
173. See, e.g., Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995)
("Wherever the line might be drawn separating tolerable delay from intolerable... delays of up
to a quarter of a century fall on the intolerable side of that line. Delays of such egregious
magnitude would render a remedy 'clearly inadequate' under PiperAircraft.");Martinez v. Dow
Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 740-41 (E.D. La. 2002) (considering Philippines inadequate
alternative forum in part due to "delays in the Philippine system" so "that [plaintiffs'] case could
take 15 years to wind its way through the court system"); cf Lear, supra note 130, at 602-03.
174. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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Article does not offer a bright line rule, but does suggest that some kind of ratio,
perhaps of three to one or greater, between the anticipated length of adjudication75 in F2
as compared to F l might help to guide courts in assessing this consideration.1
A sixth consideration involves whether the courts of F2 have extraterritorial
jurisdiction to provide a particular remedy. 176 Where the courts of F2 will not have the
power to enforce any remedy in the case because that remedy must be enforced abroad
and because F2 lacks the power to extend its reach, the courts of F2 should be deemed
unavailable to a plaintiff, at least where such relief would be available and enforceable
in F1.'7
A seventh and final consideration asks whether F2 can compensate the plaintiff
directly. This factor arises when F2 is not a foreign court but instead is some
international or supranational tribunal. In Nemariam v. FederalDemocraticRepublic
ofEthiopia, 71the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
district court abused its discretion in finding that the Ethiopia/Eritrea Claim
Commission was an AAF because the Commission could not make an award directly to
the plaintiff and any award made to Eritrea on the plaintiff s behalf could be offset by
debts Eritrea owed to Ethiopia. The court rejected the defendant's claim that its
"inten[t] to give directly to the Claimants" was equivalent to the Commission having
the "power... to enforce its judgments." 79 Essentially, the court was unwilling to rely
on the "goodwill"8 0 of the defendant when the AAF lacked the power to enforce the
informal waiver.1
By contrast to the seven considerations courts should weigh in deciding whether a
meaningful remedy exists in F2, one controversial issue courts should not include in
their analysis is whether punitive damages are available in F2. As numerous circuit and
district courts have held, where the law of F2 does not allow punitive damages, the
forum nevertheless may still be deemed available so long as some
form of remedy or
18 1
redress is available to compensate the plaintiff for its injuries.

175. See id. at 424-25. This inquiry may be difficult for courts to compute with certainty.
Even the timeframe for adjudication in Fl may not be entirely certain. Once again, courts should
consider additional briefing by the parties (with support through affidavits or reliance on the
backlog in the courts of F2) where this consideration is in issue.
176. Del-Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (S.D. Fla.
2001) (holding that Costa Rica was not AAF, in part because "Costa Rican courts could not
enjoin [Defendant's] activities in the United States and Honduras, where [Defendant] grows its
pineapples," where claim involved Lanham Act); Bermudez & Co. v. Bermudez Int'l, 99 Civ.
9346,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12354, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,2000) (holding that Dominican
Republic was not AAF, in part because "Dominican courts are also not able to order the
redaction of the [United States Federal] Trademark Register" in discussing claim involving
Lanham Act).
177. See, e.g., Amermed Corp. v. Disetronic Holding AG, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375-77
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (granting forum non conviens dismissal despite "grave doubts as to the
enforceability in Switzerland of any judgment it might render"; dismissal conditioned on
defendant's waiver of bond for attorney's fees).
178. 315 F.3d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
179. Id. at 394.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305,1310,1315 (1lth Cir. 2001) (holding
that there was no abuse of discretion in finding Ecuador an AAF although punitive damages are
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In sum, in deciding whether F2 offers a meaningful remedy, courts should consider
(1) whether the statute of limitations concerns in F2 will keep plaintiff from seeking
redress; (2) whether an analogous or substitute remedy is available in F2; (3) whether a
remedy is available in F2 against all of the defendants or just some of them; (4)
whether equitable and legal remedies are available in F2 where equitable remedies are
sought; (5) whether there is a delay in the courts of F2 that would affect the substance
of the remedy the plaintiff seeks; (6) whether the courts of F2 can effectively enforce
the remedies sought in the action; and (7) in unique cases where F2 is not a foreign
court, whether the plaintiff will be able to be compensated by the forum itself.
C. FactorThree: Whether the PlaintiffWill Be TreatedFairly in Forum Two
The question of the plaintiff's treatment is linked in many ways to the
considerations in factor two above; however, whereas factor two looks to the
mechanisms available in F2's legal system to see whether that forum will allow a
successful plaintiff to recover a meaningful remedy, factor three asks whether the
particularplaintiff(s) involved in the litigation will be treated unfairly by F2 for some
reason.
The first consideration for this factor is whether the plaintiff might face political or
social persecution in F2 if forced to travel there to litigate the case.' 8 2 For example, the
unavailable); Miles v. Paribas, No. 94-56768, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25023 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
1995) (reaching the same decision in France); De Melo v. Lederle Labs., 801 F.2d 1058, 1061
(8th Cir. 1986) (reaching the same result in Brazil); Gita Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH
& Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 432,440 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (holding unavailability of punitive damages
in Germany does not render it an inadequate alternative forum); Alpine At. Asset Mgmt. AG v.
Comstock, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276 (D. Kan. 2008) (coming to the same result in
Switzerland); DTEX, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1022 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (coming to the same result in Mexico); Creager v. Yoshimoto, No. C 05-01985 JSW,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14048, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14,2006) (coming to the same result
in Japan); Argoquest Holdings, LLC v. Isr. Discount Bank Ltd., No. CV 04-10292 (GAF)
(RNBx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46314, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2005) (coming to the same
result in Israel); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 534 n.26, 540-41
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (coming to the same result in Peru); Becker v. Club Las Velas, 94 Civ. 2412
(JFK),1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6101, at *5(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1995) (reaching the same result in
Mexico); Danser v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, Co., 86 F.R.D. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(reaching the same result for West Germany and the Netherlands); Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist
Corp. v. Fiat, S.p.A., 84 F.R.D. 299, 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (reaching the same result for Italy).
182. UNC Lear Servs. v. Saudi Arabia, No. SA-04-CA- 1008-WRF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62881, at *52-58 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2008) (recognizing that Saudi Arabia might be an
inadequate forum due to allegations by the plaintiff that the Saudi Arabian courts will
discriminate against the plaintiff's witnesses because they are all non-Saudis and non-Muslims
and that the Saudi Arabian courts will be "influenced by the executive power" of its country);
British Broad. Co. v. Siemens, 546 F. Supp. 2d 437, 445 (S.D. Tex. 2008) ("'The substantive
law of the foreign forum is presumed to be adequate unless.., conditions in the foreign forum
made known to the court, plainly demonstrate that the plaintiff is highly unlikely to obtain basic
justice there."' (quoting Tjontveit v. Den Norske Bank ASA, 997 F. Supp. 799, 805 (S.D. Tex.
1998))); In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348, 355,
357 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding inadequate "a private, nongovernmental [alternative] forum" that
was created and controlled by six European insurance companies, including two of the
defendants, where the forum was of dubious "continued viability" as an entity and was "in a
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plaintiffs in Licea v. Curacao183 were granted political asylum in the United States
after escaping from a Cuban forced labor camp located in Curacao. The plaintiffs'
alleged violations of the law of nations involved a conspiracy between the defendant
and the government of Cuba to "aid and abet Cuba's evasion of the Cuban embargo"
by trafficking laborers to Curacao and forcing them to work "in slave-like conditions"
under "threat of physical and psychological harm including the threat of
imprisonment."' 4 The defendant produced an affidavit from the Lieutenant Governor
of Curacao stating that the plaintiffs would not be prosecuted or deported to Cuba if
they returned to litigate their claims.' 85 The affidavit failed to overcome the court's
concerns for the safety of the plaintiffs in the alternative forum, in part because the
86
Curacao government could not control the actions of Cuban government agents.'
There was no "positive evidence" to establish that the plaintiffs escaped the extreme
conditions in Curacao and were 88granted political asylum.' 87 They faced "ongoing
danger" in the alternative forum.'
A second consideration that bears upon the treatment of the plaintiff involves
corruption in the judiciary of F2.189 The particular concern with corruption is that the
defendant may be able to buy or coerce a favorable outcome in F2. The Second
Circuit, though not couching corruption as a matter of "unfairness," has said that the
"widespread corruption in [F2's] courts" must be so severe that F2 "is characterized by
a complete absence of due process or an inability of the forum to provide substantial
justice to the parties."' 190 Courts that have considered corruption in F2's courts have
held that general allegations of corruption are not enough to find that F2 is not
available.' 9'
In the past, several courts have considered treatment of the plaintiff as part of the
omnibus inquiry into whether an adequate remedy is available in F2.192 As discussed

sense the company store").
183. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
184. Id. at 1272.
185. Id. at 1274.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.at 1274-75.
189. See, e.g., Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 738 (E.D. La.2002)
(identifying "fundamental defects [in Honduras's judicial system] that indicate a high likelihood
that plaintiffs will be treated unfairly, especially given that defendants may well be the type of
'powerful special interests' that 'exercise influence and often prevail in courts').
190. Monegasque de Rassurances S.A.M. v. NakNaftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d
Cir. 2002).
191. Rustal Trading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App'x 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[G]eneral
allegations of corruption or bias on the part of the foreign forum will not prevent a dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds."); Gonzales v. P.T. Pelangi Niagra Mitra Int'l, 196 F. Supp. 2d
482, 488 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (collecting cases to support the proposition that "[tihe overwhelming
majority of courts addressing [the argument that the alternative forum is generally too corrupt to
be adequate] have rejected allegations of corruption or bias on the part of the foreign forum as a
means of preventing a forum non conveniens dismissal").
192. See Cortec v. Erste Bank, 535 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Cabiri v.
Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press,
574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd,767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985); Canadian Overseas
Ores Ltd. v. Compania De Acero Del Pacifico, S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y.

1096

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 85:1059

above, the underlying question of the treatment that a plaintiffwill receive in F2 should
not be conflated with the adequacy of a remedy in F2. Similarly, questions of practical
access to the courts of F2 (factor four) have been included in the adequate remedy
considerations. Courts will need to separate these two inquiries and consider each on
its own merits.
Four cases from Southern District of New York illustrate this point best. In each
case, the court held that no AAF existed because the alternative forum did not provide
an adequate remedy. However, the facts of each case are so different-and speak to
such different deficiencies within the alternative forum--that, of the four cases, only
one would even fall into the meaningful remedy inquiry of the AAF test proposed in
this Article (factor two). In PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
the court held that because non-Muslim plaintiffs would have reduced rights in Sudan
under Islamic law, and because no remedy was available for the type of claim the
plaintiffs were raising, Sudan was not an adequate forum.' 93 Under the proposed test,
these facts should be considered under factor two (as a discussion of whether the
remedies left available to plaintiffs could be deemed meaningful) and as part of factor
three (as a discussion of the treatment plaintiffs would receive as non-Muslims).
In Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, a court in the same district held that Ghana was an
inadequate forum where the Ghanaian plaintiff feared persecution in Ghana if he sued
alleging torture by Ghanaian officials in their courts.' 94 Similarly, in Rasoulzadeh v.
AssociatedPress, the court held that there was no alternative forum because "if the
plaintiffs returned to Iran to prosecute this claim, they would probably be shot."' 95
Both of these cases should be considered under factor four of the proposed AAF test
(whether all plaintiffs have practical access to the courts of F2).
Finally, in CanadianOverseas Ores Ltd. v. CompaniaDe Acero Del Pacifico,S.A.,
the court held that Chile was an inadequate forum because one party was a state-owned
corporation and thus there were "serious questions about the independence of the
Chilean judiciary vis-i-vis the military junta currently in power."' 196 This set of facts
would be relevant to factor three of the proposed AAF test.
Not all of the facts will cut in favor of the plaintiffs, though. Courts should be able
to use the fact that the plaintiff previously availed itself of F2's court in related
litigation as evidence that the plaintiff will not be treated unfairly in F2.197 That said,
the fact that plaintiff has availed itself of F2 in related litigation should not create a per
se assumption that F2 is available. This consideration should be relevant only to factor
1982).
193. 224 F. Supp. 2d 289, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
194. 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
195. 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
196. 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
197. See, e.g., J.C. Renfroe & Sons, Inc. v. Renfroe Japan Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 126970, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that Japan is an AAF and noting as part of the subsequent
"private interests" analysis that plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to less deference because
plaintiff previously availed itself of F2's courts in related litigation); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Sphere
Drake Ins. Ltd., 01 Civ. 3226 (BSJ), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13105, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2002) (finding that England is an AAF and noting that "litigation is currently underway in
England involving the same issues and identical parties as in this action"); Martino v. Viacao
Aerea Riograndense, S.A., No. 90-1883, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1114, at '14 (E.D. La. Jan. 10,
1991) (reasoning that because the party had already "begun actions against [the defendant] in
their home forum [the AAF]," it was an adequate and available forum).
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three. Other considerations, such as the nature of the relief sought in the more recent
litigation, should be evaluated as well. In addition, the mere fact that the plaintiff has
been a party in F2 in the past (in unrelated litigation) should not be sufficient to create
a presumption that this factor has been satisfied. Such a presumption should be made
only where the litigation in F2 is related to the pending litigation in F 1.
In sum, factor three calls on a court to find out whether the plaintiff will be treated
fairly in F2 by looking at three considerations: (1) whether the plaintiff will face
political or social persecution in that forum; (2) whether there is corruption in the
judiciary of F2; and (3) whether plaintiff's complaints about the fairness of F2 are
offset (or potentially bolstered) by past litigation by plaintiff in that forum.
D. FactorFour: Whether All Plaintiffs Have PracticalAccess to the Courts of
Forum Two
The two most important considerations under this factor involve the plaintiff's
financial resources and bars to literal ingress to or egress from F2. Commonly invoked
financial concerns include the plaintiff's ability to hire counsel through a contingency
fee arrangement in F2,198 the amount of filing fees or other fees required in F2,' 99 and

198. See, e.g., Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287,292-93 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
the United Kingdom to be an AAF despite unavailability of contingency fee arrangement);
Coakes v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 1987); Lehman v. Humphrey
Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that district court failed to
properly consider effect of Cayman Island's lack of contingency system on plaintiff's ability to
litigate suit; arguing multinational companies often avoid liability, especially in developing
countries, because the "unavailability of a lawyer working on a contingency fee basis can deter a
meritorious claim"); von Spee v. von Spee, 514 F. Supp. 2d 302, 315 (D. Conn 2007); Loya v.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts, No. C06-0815MJP, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 49012 (W.D. Wash. July
6, 2007) (holding AAF exists despite testimony that plaintiffwould have to pay more in attorney
fees than plaintiff would likely recover, with no contingency fees and no recovery of attorney's
fees for prevailing parties); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1170 (C.D. Cal.
2002) ("[T]he unavailability of class actions and contingency fee counsel (if indeed such
counsel are unavailable), as well as constraints on discovery, do not render Papua New Guinea
an inadequate forum."); Lear, supra note 130, at 578.
199. CompareSangeorzan v. Yangming Marine Transp. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.
Tex. 1997) (holding that Taiwan was not an AAF in part because Taiwan required a percentage
of claimed damages to be paid to the court as a fee, and the plaintiff could not afford to pay even
one percent, the lowest possible percentage, due to very high damages claimed), with Altman v.
Republic of Austria, 318 F.3d 954, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that filing fee did not
render Austria an inadequate forum), Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1283
(11 th Cir. 2001) (holding that Argentina was not an inadequate forum due to its filing fees and
lack of discovery), Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 1353 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Turkey's requirement that a
plaintiff post a "cost bond" did not render it an inadequate forum), Henderson v. Metro. Bank &
Trust Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 372, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that plaintiff's inability to
pay enormous filing fees in F2 did not make F2 inadequate), and Diatronics, Inc. v. Elbit
Computers, Ltd., 649 F. Supp. 122, 127-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that requiring a plaintiff
to pay the alternate forum's court a nonrefundable fee of two percent of the damages sought,
even if plaintiff contends he cannot pay the fee, does not render an alternate forum inadequate),
aft'd, 812 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1987).
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the amount2°or° type of damages recoverable in F2 relative to the costs of litigating in
that forum.
Although some courts have considered such financial concerns under the second
prong of the forum non conveniens analysis (the balance of private and public
201
factors),2 °' it makes more sense
to consider financial concerns in the AAF inquiry.202 A

200. See, e.g., Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 952 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[S]mall
differences in standards and procedural differences (such as.. . less generous rules for recovery
of attorney's fees) are beside the point [in the AAF inquiry]."); Loya, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49012, at *17-19 (holding that AAF exists despite testimony that the plaintiff would have to pay
more in attorney fees than the plaintiff would likely recover, with no contingency fees and no
recovery of attorney's fees for prevailing parties).
201. This view is particularly prevalent in the Second Circuit, where the court stated and
adopted a "majority rule" in Murray v. British BroadcastingCorp., 81 F.3d 287, 292 (2d Cir.

1996): "The majority of courts deem a plaintiff's financial hardships resulting from the absence
of contingent fee arrangements to be only one factor to be weighed in determining the balance of
convenience after the court determines that an alternative forum is available." Id. (emphasis in
original); see also Gross v. British Broad. Corp., 386 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 2004) ("A party's
claim of financial hardship is not an appropriate aspect of determining the availability of an
alternative forum, but rather is a factor to be considered in the balancing of interests that bear on
convenience, a balancing process that is to be performed after identifying an alternative forum."
(citing Murray, 81 F.3d at 292-93) (emphasis in original)); Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132
F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to consider as part of the AAF inquiry
plaintiff's arguments that "the financial barriers he would face.. . 'effectively mean that the
United Kingdom would be no forum at all"'). More broadly, the Fifth Circuit held in Gonzalez
v. Chrysler Corp. that "[a]s a point that might fall in the technical category, the economic
viability of a lawsuit [from the plaintiffs perspective] may be more appropriate for
consideration as a private interest factor, after the court has made the threshold determination
that the alternative forum is both amenable and adequate." 301 F.3d 377, 382 n.8 (5th Cir.
2002). The Fifth Circuit panel ultimately rejected economic viability as part of the AAF inquiry,
in part because "we find troublesome and lacking in guiding principle the fact that the adequacy
determination could hinge on constantly varying and arbitrary differences underlying the
'economic viability' of a lawsuit." Id. at 383. This approach taken by the Second and Fifth
Circuits might be a reflection of Gulf Oil's final, catchall private-interest factor: "all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869
(1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)). But, as explained below, see infranote 201 and
accompanying text, this Article suggests that the plaintiff's financial situation should be part of
the AAF inquiry, essentially because legitimate financial hardships imposed by filing suit in F2
go beyond mere expedience (the focus of the second step of the forum non conveniens analysis)
and straight to the heart of whether F l has any discretion to exercise in the matter, which hinges
on the existence of at least one other AAF in which the plaintiff can seek a remedy. See supra
Part I.
202. The First Circuit has apparently taken this approach, explaining in Mercier v.Sheraton
International,Inc.:

The second proposed condition, requiring Sheraton to waive the "cost bond"
commonly imposed on foreign litigants in Turkish courts, presents a somewhat
closer question. It has been noted that an action should not be dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds without first considering "the realities of the plaintiffs
position, financial or otherwise, and his or her ability as a practical matter to bring
suit in the alternative forum." On the other hand, we perceive no abuse of
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plaintiff, indigent or otherwise, who cannot afford to file suit in F2 will not do so.
Thus, ignoring a plaintiff's genuine financial limitations in the AAF inquiry could
deprive an aggrieved party of its only opportunity for recovery.
The question remains as to how severe the plaintiff's financial predicament must be
to justify a finding of no AAF on that basis alone. Certainly, courts should be given
discretion to decide whether the financial impediments in F2 will truly render that
forum unavailable or will simply make the forum less attractive to the plaintiff. In the
latter case, courts should be allowed to treat F2 as available and turn to the second
prong of the forum non conveniens analysis. This Article will not attempt to draw lines
any more solidly than that, but this Article will suggest that some courts have made
unreasonable demands on plaintiffs of modest means, and indigent plaintiffs. For
example, in Murray v. British BroadcastingCorp.,203 the Southern District of New
York remarkably concluded:
The information Murray has provided suggests that although he does not have
liquid assets sufficient to cover the expenses he expects to incur litigating in
England, he is not of such limited means that the English prohibition on
contingent-fee arrangements would prevent him from pursuing his claim. He owns
a profitable business, a home and an automobile. He is credit-worthy, as evidenced
by the loans he 2obtained
to purchase and renovate his apartment and to purchase
4
his automobile.

0

In Murray, the plaintiff "estimate[d] that he [would] incur legal fees ... of at least
£L100,000-150,000," while his average annual pretax personal income for the three
years preceding the suit was about £50,000.205 But he also "own[ed] an apartment in

London valued at £110,000, which secure[d] total mortgage indebtedness of£100,885
20 6
and an automobile on which he [had to] make payments for one more year.,
Apparently, the court expected Murray to sell or use as collateral his business, his
home, and his car to bring suit in F2. On appeal, the Second Circuit "agree[d] with
Judge Stanton's conclusion that Murray's financial condition [was] less severe than
those that have previously justified retention of litigation in an otherwise inconvenient

discretion in the district court ruling that the burden presented by the "cost bond"
requirement did not rise to a level which would render the Turkish forum "so
clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that [it effectively offered] no remedy at all."
981 F.2d 1345, 1353 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d
339, 346 (8th Cir. 1983)); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,254 (1981). Note,
too, that the First Circuit chose to include this inquiry as part of the adequacy of the remedy in
Turkey rather than as its own separate factor as proposed here. The court in Mercier also
discussed Macedo v. Boeing Co., 693 F.2d 683, 688, 690 (7th Cir. 1982), where the court had
said that a "cost bond" requirement may be given weight in the forum-balancing process as an
example of how this factor can be relevant in determining that no alternative forum is available.
But the court also mentioned Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9, 16 (N.D.Cal. 1982),
aff'd, 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983), where the First Circuit noted that a "filing fee" amounting
to one percent of the recovery sought was deemed irrelevant to the adequacy of the foreign
forum.
203. 906 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 81 F.3d 287 (1996).
204. Murray, 906 F. Supp. at 864 (footnote omitted).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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' 20 7

Judge Stanton had cited two cases from the Southern District ofNew York
in which the plaintiff's financial hardship "justified retention of litigation" 2 8:

forum.

[I]n McKrell v. PentaHotels (France),703 F. Supp. 13, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the

court held that the alternative forum was not available because the plaintiff lacked
the financial ability to litigate there: she owed $10,000 in medical bills which she
was unable to pay, that her health insurance would expire soon, and that she had
assets of under $50. Similarly, in Fiorenzav. UnitedStates Steellnt 'l,311 F.Supp.
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court denied aforum non conveniens motion because,
among other reasons, the alternative forum prohibited contingent-fee arrangements
and the plaintiff could not pre-pay a retainer. The plaintiff had no source of
income, had been unable to work since the accident
over which he sued, and was
29
living with his brother, who supported him.

0

Again, without trying to draw lines, this Article suggests that courts should not require
plaintiffs to be destitute to defeat a forum non conveniens motion on financial
grounds. 210 Nor should courts expect plaintiffs to sell their homes and cars to pursue a
suit in F2. Rather, as stated above, the crux of the analysis should be this: whether the
financial impediments in F2 will truly, in practice, render that forum unavailable and
unused.21'

207. Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 294 (2d Cir. 1996).
208. Id
209. Murray, 906 F. Supp. at 864-65.

210. With regard to contingency fee arrangements, the court in Fiorenza v. U.S. Steel
International, Ltd. denied dismissal under forum non conveniens in part because the
impecunious plaintiff, dependent on his brother for financial support of his family since the
injury, was unable to bring suit in an alternative forum that banned contingency fee
arrangements. 311 F. Supp. 117, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In another case, the plaintiff's
medical bills, expiring health insurance coverage, and lack of assets convinced the court that the
alternative forum was "no forum at all" due to the lack of contingency fee arrangements.
McKrell v. Penta Hotels, 703 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(quoting Magistrate report at 17);
see also Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339,345-46 (8th Cir. 1983); Lear, supra
note 130, at 578 n.86. Contra Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 292-93 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding the United Kingdom is an AAF despite unavailability of contingency fee
arrangement); Coakes v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 1987); Loya v.
Starwood Hotels &Resorts, No. C06-0815MJP, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 49012 (W.D. Wash. July
6,2007) (holding AAF exists despite testimony that plaintiff would have to pay more in attorney
fees than plaintiff would likely recover, with no contingency fees and no recovery of attorney's
fees for prevailing parties); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1170 (C.D. Cal.
2002) ("[T]he unavailability of class actions and contingency fee counsel (if indeed such
counsel are unavailable), as well as constraints on discovery, do not render Papua New Guinea
an inadequate forum.").
211. See Coakes, 831 F.2d at 576 ("If the lack of a contingent-fee system were held
determinative, then a case could almost never be dismissed because contingency fees are not
allowed in most foreign forums."). But cf William L. Reynolds, The ProperForum Fora Suit:
TransnationalForumNon Conveniens andCounter-SuitInjunctions in the FederalCourts,70

TEx. L. REv. 1663, 1669 (1992) ("[A]ttomey compensation should not be a controlling factor in
the adequate alternative forum inquiry; to make the case turn on that factor, given the
uniqueness of the American fee system, would eviscerate forum non conveniens" leading to a
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This fourth AAF factor also involves asking another, more direct (and, though more
uncommon, also more problematic) question, namely whether the plaintiff is somehow
foreclosed from entering F2 altogether. This inquiry would call on courts to make a
straightforward assessment of whether any bars exist that would keep the plaintiff(s)
from traveling to and therefore pursuing litigation in F2. The best example of this
factor comes from a 1987 case in the Southern District ofNew York, Galu v. SwissAir,
in which the court reasoned that Switzerland was not an AAF because the plaintiff was
"not allowed entry into Switzerland. 212 Galu's complaint originated with her allegedly
illegal arrest while she was working in Switzerland for the United Nations. After an
expulsion order was signed, she was taken in handcuffs to a SwissAir plane, where she
alleged that she was physically abused by Swiss policewomen.213 Swiss courts rejected
Galu's appeal of the expulsion order. The district court in New York held that Galu
would need to testify in the case to prevail, so litigation of her claims in Switzerland
"would be tantamount to directing a verdict for [the] defendant., 214 Under 2these
5
circumstances, the forum should be treated by the court as entirely unavailable. 1
Interestingly, this concern of literal ingress to and egress from F2 was recognized
before Piperas well as after. In Fiorenzav. U.S. Steel International,Ltd, the Southern
District of New York credited the plaintiff's contention that he would not be able "to
remain or to reenter" F2 due to an expired entry permit. 216 The court held that this and
other evidence of the unavailability of F2 "outweigh[ed]" any balance of private and
public interests in the defendant's favor, and thus recognized the preeminent
importance of the AAF inquiry, which the
court described in 1969 as a "new factor in
217
the [forum non conveniens] equation.
Another example of a case that somewhat ironically falls into this category is
Johnston v. Multidata Systems InternationalCorp., where the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that a Panamanian statute deprived Panamanian courts
2 18
of jurisdiction in cases dismissed under forum non conveniens in other countries.
The plaintiffs in Johnston suffered severe injury or death when their radiation
treatments at a Panamanian cancer-treatment center exceeded recommended doses by
ranges from twenty to two hundred percent.219 A 2001 suit against the Canadian
manufacturer of the radiation unit was filed in a Missouri state court, where the claims

"back-door gutting of the doctrine."). Note that this Article does not propose that the absence of
contingency fee arrangements in F2 automatically renders that forum unavailable; but rather, the
absence of contingency fee arrangements must be considered as part of a meaningful analysis
into whether F2 is truly available. To ignore the question altogether would gut any serious
inquiry into the availability of an alternative forum.
212. No. 86 Civ. 5551, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12628, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1987).
213. Id. at *2.
214. Id. at *4.
215. This consideration should be treated the same regardless of the reason why the plaintiff
is foreclosed from entering F2. Indeed, it should even include a situation where the plaintiff is
foreclosed from entering F2 based on its own wrongdoing, such as criminal indictments pending
there against it.
216. 311 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
217. Id.at 121.
218. No. G-06-CV-313,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32294, at *87-90 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30,2007),
rev'don othergrounds, 523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008).
219. Id. at *7-8.
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were dismissed under forum non conveniens for litigation in Panama."0 After four
additional attempts to litigate in Missouri failed, the plaintiffs filed claims in the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in 2006. Concurrently, four of the
plaintiffs attempted to litigate in Panama, the AAF identified by the Missouri Court.
The judicial district for Panama City promptly dismissed the case.221 The Texas district
court found that the Panamanian National Assembly passed a statute in 2006 that
"deprive[d] Panamanian courts ofjurisdiction over cases filed in foreign countries that
have been dismissed under the doctrine offorum non conveniens.''222 By requiring
Panamanian courts to dismiss suits filed after dismissal elsewhere on the basis of forum
non conveniens, the law rendered Panama an inadequate forum, and the defendants'
forum non conveniens motion was denied. 223 Similar laws in Costa Rica and Venezuela
have led to4 conflicting results in American courts conducting a forum non conveniens
22
analysis.
In passing it should be noted that this fourth AAF factor arguably overlaps with
extreme personal difficulty of the sort discussed with factor three above. But as the
Ninth Circuit held in TennecalFundingCorp. v. SakuraBank,225 "[p]ersonal difficulty,
as opposed to a forum's systematic inadequacy, is not a proper factor for the court to

220. Id. at *9-12.
221. Id. at'12-13.

222. Id. at *88. This kind of law appears to be akin to the blocking statutes that were
developed largely in response to American-style discovery. For example, Article 1A of French
Penal Code Law No. 80-538 and Article 271, paragraph 1 of the Swiss Penal Code block
requests for discovery related to foreign proceedings by imposing criminal penalties for
compliance with such requests. See Socidtd Nationale Industrielle A&ospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987) (examining French blocking statute); In re Aspartame Antitrust
Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2008 WL 2275531, at *4 n.l (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2008)
(examining Swiss blocking statute). Unlike those blocking statutes, though, the Panamanian
statute and different variations of it adopted in Costa Rica and Venezuela, which will be
discussed below, demonstrate deference to a forum first seised of a matter and appear to be
aimed at avoiding problems of concurrent litigation.
223. Johnston, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32294, at *91.
224. For a case concluding that Costa Rica's laws on concurrent jurisdiction precluded
dismissal to that forum, see Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 728 (E.D. La.
2002). But see Tingle v. Banks, 232 F. App'x 956, 956 (11 th Cir.2007) ("Costa Rica provides
an adequate forum and the Tingles can reinstate their lawsuit there without prejudice, given that
the defendants have agreed to submit to the court's jurisdiction and the defendants are amenable
to process there."); Borja v. Dole Food Co., No. 3:97-CV-308-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23234,
at *13-14 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2002) (finding Costa Rica an adequate alternative forum despite
the dismissal of similar claims in Costa Rican courts after forum non conviens dismissal). For a
case holding that Venezuelan law similarly precludes dismissal, see In reBridgestoneFirestone
Inc. Tires ProductsLiabilityLitigigation, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129-30 (S.D. Ind. 2002). But

see Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (2004) (responding directly and
holding that "[a] Ithough another United States District Court has accepted the analysis advanced
by the Plaintiffs and their expert, this court cannot agree with the aforesaid analysis." (citation
omitted)). For a nice recent discussion of this and related topics, see Rajeev Muttreja, Note,
How to Fix the Inconsistent Application of Forum Non Conveniens to Latin American
Jurisdiction-AndWhy ConsistencyMay Not Be Enough, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1607, 1619-34

(2008).
225. No. 94-56515, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544 (9th Cir. June 19, 1996).
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consider when assessing the adequacy of an alternative forum," despite the
nonmovant's argument that the nonmovant's CEO "would be in extreme personal
danger from the Japanese Mafia if he went [to Japan, the proposed alternative
forum] .,226 The distinction drawn by that court (more than the result it reached in its
analysis) demonstrates the distinction that is drawn here between factor three and
factor four.
To summarize, factor four asks whether all plaintiffs have practical access to the
courts of F2. The two major considerations under this factor are the plaintiffs financial
resources and any bars to literal ingress to or egress from F2. Although courts may also
consider other issues of practical access, they should at the very least ensure that (1) no
financial impediments in F2 will truly, in practice, render that forum unavailable and
unused, and (2) the plaintiff is not somehow foreclosed from entering F2 altogether.
E. FactorFive: Whether Forum Two Provides ProceduralDue Process
While F2 need not mirror an American court in its procedural devices (prejudgment
attachment, discovery methods, etc.), F2 still must offer sufficient minimal procedural
devices so that the plaintiff can pursue its lawsuit. 227 Without such devices, the plaintiff
might be denied the procedural due process that is so fundamental to the American
civil justice system.
28
As the First Circuit noted in Mercier v. Sheraton International,
We are unable to accept two additional proposals made by the Merciers, which
contemplate, in effect, that Turkish procedure be brought more in line with the
procedures utilized in American courts, as a condition of dismissal. The first
proposal-an amorphous request that Sheraton be required to "facilitate
discovery" in the foreign forum-was not raised below, either before or after
remand, and must be rejected here. Turkish courts have their own procedures for
compelling discovery. The case law is clear that an alternative forum ordinarily is
not considered "inadequate" merely because its courts afford different229or less
generous discovery procedures than are available under American rules.
Many other courts have taken a similar position, noting that procedural devices can be
quite different from those that would be available in an American forum. 230 In Zermeno

226. Tennecal Funding, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16544, at *5.
227. See, e.g., Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 952 (lst Cir. 1991) ("[S]mall
differences in standards and procedural difficulties.., are beside the point.").
228. 981 F.2d 1345 (1st Cir. 1992).
229. Mercier, 981 F.2d at 1352-53 (citations omitted).
230. See Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding a Japanese forum adequate even though discovery procedures were "not
identical to those in the United States"); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding an Indian forum
adequate although Indian discovery rules were more limited than United States rules; Indian
courts could voluntarily accept American rules, but this would not determine propriety of
dismissal by American court); Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1484 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding a Singapore forum adequate available forum even though depositions allowed only in
certain circumstances); Ridley Bagel, Ltd. v. Kellogg Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (E.D.
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v. McDonnell DouglasCorp., discovery limitations, lack of ajury trial, and difficulties
submitting photographs and photocopies into evidence were "not so great as to deprive
the plaintiffs of any remedy in a Mexican court.",23' The court in Carneyv. Singapore
Airlines noted that Indonesian law applied to the case regardless of the site of the trial,
thus rendering procedural differences immaterial.232
233
When, as in In re Union Carbide,
a court feels that any dismissal must be
conditioned on an agreement by the defendant to adhere to American-style discovery,
the court has implicitly acknowledged that F2's discovery process is inadequate in the
eyes of F 1.234 Conditions on discovery impinge on the sovereignty of F2 but-above
all-demonstrate that F 1 may believe that F2 is unable to handle the litigation in
question. Where a court makes such a determination, it should find that the alternative
forum is not available rather than conditioning dismissal on changes to procedural rules
or processes in F2.
In assessing this factor, courts might consider whether F2 has sufficiently developed
legal institutions for a plaintiff's potential recovery. For example, the court in Martinez
v. Dow ChemicalCo. considered the Honduran judiciary system's inadequate funding,
low wages, lack of internal controls, bribery of law enforcement officials, pressure
from outside influences, and the inefficient, opaque nature of the inquisitorial civil law
system as factors in its determination that Honduras did not provide an adequate
235
alternative forum.
This consideration can arise as part of other inquiries, including'factor two (the "no
remedy at all" inquiry) 236 and factor three (the "unfairness" inquiry). 237 However,in an
effort to streamline the AAF inquiry and create clearer lines of inquiry, factor five

Mich. 2002) (finding that England is an AAF in part because "the alleged differences inthe U.S.
and U.K. [discovery] procedures fall well short of the finding necessary to conclude that
[England is not an AAF]" in part because the differences "would not bar this action (or even
necessarily hinder it) from proceeding through the English courts"); Kempe v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 683 F. Supp. 1964, 1067-68 (E.D. La. 1988) (finding that Bermuda is an AAF
in part because "Bermuda discovery is [not] so unfair as to constitute a complete denial of due
process").
231. 246 F. Supp. 2d 646, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
232. 940 F. Supp. 1496, 1500 n.6 (D. Ariz. 1996).
233. For a discussion of In re Union Carbide,see supra Part IL.
234. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,634 F.
Supp. 842, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); see also
Boskoffv. Transportes Aeroes Portugueses, Nos. 79 C 4771; 74 C 4772, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16547, at *13 (N.D. Il. June 1, 1983) (defendant voluntarily submitted to "American-style"
discovery rules when case was dismissed on forum non conveniens).
235. 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 737-38 (E.D. La. 2002) (finding the shortcomings to be
"fundamental defects that indicate a high likelihood that plaintiffs will be treated unfairly"); see
also Zermeno, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
236. See, e.g., Ridley Bagel, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (finding that England is an AAF in part
because "the alleged differences in the U.S. and U.K. procedures fall well short of the finding
necessary to conclude that Plaintiff would be denied a satisfactory remedy in the English
courts").
237. See, e.g., Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38 (identifying "fundamental defects" in
Honduras's judicial system "that indicate a high likelihood that plaintiffs will be treated
unfairly, especially given that defendants may well be the type of 'powerful special interests'
that 'exercise influence and often prevail in the courts'").
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should be separated from the others and treated on its own. That said, where the
procedural devices are different in F2 but not sufficiently so for F2 to be considered
inadequate, this factor can be combined with others to lead a court to determine that F2
is not available as well.
F. FactorSix: Whether Forum Two is a Stable Forum
Courts have taken different views on whether the stability of F2 should be a factor
in deciding whether an AAF exists. 238 However, in a thorough inquiry into the

availability of an alternative forum, this factor must be considered separately. This
sixth factor will be the most straightforward for a court to assess: it asks whether F2 is
for some reason sufficiently unstable that, even though it might be available at the
present moment, it may not be available at some point during the litigation's pendency.
So, for example, in 2003, a district court denied a forum non conveniens motion in
part because "the situation in Pakistan [the proposed AAF] is constantly changing"
during the War on Terror. 239 By contrast, just one year earlier, a district court in the
Southern District of New York found that "[u]ndoubtedly, the record offered by
plaintiffs indicates that Nigeria [the proposed AAF] is a nation experiencing
difficulties in its transition from a dictatorship to a democracy. However, nothing in
plaintiffs' submissions reaches beyond the most general of characterizations. 240 This
inquiry should focus on the stability of F2 both at the present moment and while the
litigation is likely to be pending. 241 As the cases indicate, stability is a relative question
but courts should be wary to find another forum unstable only in cases where there is
strong evidence to suggest that the forum faces such turmoil that the instability of the
forum would render it unavailable as a location where justice can be sought reliably.

238. See, e.g., Accordia Ne., Inc. v. Thesseus Int'l Asset Fund, N.V., 205 F. Supp. 2d 176,
179 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Here, the court is concerned that, given the chaos that has characterized

Kosovo until only recently, the territory may be lacking even the rudiments of the rule of law.");
Sablic v. Armada Shipping Aps, 973 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding Croatia not an
AAF "in large part [due to] the political and military instability of the region"). But see Rustal
Trading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App'x 331, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[P]olitical unrest in a
foreign jurisdiction [will not] render the forum inadequate absent some showing that the unrest
has had an adverse effect on the judicial system there."); Diaz v. Aerovias Nacionales de
Colom., S.A., No. 90 Civ. 1215(MEL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2943, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
1991) ("While it is true that terrible things have happened in [proposed AAF] Colombia as a
result of... civil unrest .... and that judges have been murdered and threatened, the subject
matter of that unrest and those crimes has had nothing to do with the disposition of ordinary
There has been no breakdown of the judicial system and everyday life is
civil cases ....
proceeding routinely for the citizens of Colombia and visitors to Colombia.").
239. I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., No. 01-0241 (PLF), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23500, at *26 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2003), affd inpartand rev'd in part on other grounds,
351 F.3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
240. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *26
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002), vacated, 77 Fed. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (granting forum non
conveniens motion and finding Nigeria to be an adequate alternative forum).
241. This factor offers another opportunity for courts to seek additional briefing from the
parties. See id.
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One underlying concern with this factor is that it calls on courts to analyze the
stability of another forum, raising at least some of the concerns at the heart ofthe act of
state doctrine. The act of state doctrine is a common-law doctrine that originated from
the strict interpretation of sovereignty expressed in Underhillv. Hernandez: "the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory." 242 Considering the stability of F2 as a factor in the AAF
analysis does not call on U.S. courts to judge the acts of a foreign state taken on its
own territory. Instead, this factor asks U.S. courts to assess whether the courts of F2
are sufficiently stable to allow the plaintiff a reasonable chance to pursue its action
there instead of in F 1. For example, the court in Accordia Northeast,Inc. v. Thesseus
InternationalAsset Fund,N. V., Inc. held that Kosovo was not an adequate alternative
forum due to "the chaos that has characterized... the territory [to the extent that it]
may be lacking even the rudiments of the rule of law.

' 243

When political instability

adversely affects the judicial system of another forum, that forum can no longer be
considered an available alternative to litigation in the United States when the American
court is properly seised ofjurisdiction.
G. Some Nonfactors
It is worthwhile to discuss some considerations that have been relevant to courts in
recent years but should not be considerations in the AAF analysis. For example, some
courts have considered in their AAF determination whether other federal courts,
especially in the same circuit, have considered F2 to be an AAF in a case raising a
similar claim. As the district court for the Southern District of Indiana said in In re
Bridgestone/FirestoneInc.:
We are unpersuaded by Firestone's citation to cases finding that Venezuela is an
adequate alternative forum. Given the highly fact specific nature of the forum non
conveniens inquiry, the courts in the cases cited by Firestone could no more
conclude that Venezuela is an adequate forum for all time in all cases than we
could find that Venezuela is not an adequate alternative forum for all time in all
cases.... We share the Third Circuit's sentiment [in Bhatnagarv. Surrendra

Overseas,Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1230 (3d Cir. 1995)] that "[i]t may well be that the
next defendant to face the same issue.., would reach a different result because it
would marshal more--or better-proof."244

242. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 428 (1964) ("[Tlhe Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law."), supersededby statute, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633,
78 Stat. 1009 (1964) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2006)).
243. 205 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
244. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132
n.6 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (emphasis in original) (third and fourth alteration in original) (citations
omitted); see also Borja v. Dole Food Co., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-308-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23234, at *11 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2002) (finding that cases cited by defendant "focus
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Similarly, in Jota v. Texaco, Inc., the Second Circuit made it clear that a forum non
conveniens dismissal should not rely
"entirely on adoption of another district court's
245
weighing of the relevant factors."
By contrast, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that despite "the Second Circuit's
admonition in Jota,. . . it is not inappropriate to note that a number of other American
courts have
held that the [proposed F2] Peruvian courts furnish an adequate alternative
24 6
forum.

As these two cases illustrate, different courts will reach different conclusions about
the availability of an alternative forum in a particular case. Because of the wide
discretion left to trial courts in forum non conveniens motions (even under the
proposed AAF test), courts should make their own decisions on the availability of F2.
To rely on a sister court to substitute that court's judgment for its own, and, given the
significant implications of a forum non conveniens dismissal, courts should engage in a
thorough inquiry into the availability of an alternative forum whenever they are likely
to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds. However, courts should be able to
streamline their own inquiries by drawing on some of the findings by sister courts.
While those findings should not be treated as determinative,247 they can be useful in
alleviating some of the burden imposed by this new AAF test.
A second consideration that should not, on its own, be part of the AAF inquiry is
whether a party has availed itself of F2's courts in the past.248 It was argued above249
that courts should be able to use the fact that the plaintiff previously availed itself of
F2's courts in relatedlitigation as evidence that the plaintiff will not be treated unfairly
in F2 (factor four in the AAF inquiry proposed here). 250 But, as noted in that

primarily on the private and public interest factors and not the availability of a Costa Rican
forum [so that] these cases provide little assistance in determining whether Costa Rica is
available [in the case before the court]").
245. 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998).
246. 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 539 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted) (citing four cases
from other circuits concluding that Peru was an AAF); accordMcLellan v. Am. Eurocopter,
Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 947, 950 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("However, while it is not irrelevant that some
federal courts have found Canada to be an adequate, alternative forum, it is also not controlling
given the fact specific nature of a forum non conveniens inquiry."); see also Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Other U.S. courts have found Ecuador to be an
adequate forum for hosting tort suits."); Gonzales v. P.T. Pelangi Niagra Mitra Int'l, 196 F.
Supp. 2d 482, 487 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. v. StorkWerkspoor Diesel, B.V., No.-1294, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1404, at *7-8 (E.D. La. Feb. 5,
1991), affd, Empressa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. v. Schichau-Unterweser, A.G., 955
F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1992).
247. See infra Part II.H.
248. For cases where previous availment is considered proof of an adequate AAF, see, for
example, Dickson MarineInc. v. Panalpina,Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 342 (Sth Ci. 1999); Martinov.
Viacao Aerea Riograndense, S.A., No. 90-1883, 1991 WL 13886, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 25,

1991); Fustok v. Banque PopulaireSuisse, 546 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
249. See supra Part II.C.
250. See, e.g., von Spee v. von Spee, 514 F. Supp. 2d 302, 314-15 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding
plaintiffs' multiple court proceedings in Germany against the defendants were "a good
indication of the availability and adequacy of the German judicial system"); J.C. Renfroe &
Sons, Inc. v. Renfroe Japan Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1269-70 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ("[P]laintiffs
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discussion, such use of the plaintiff's previous availment of F2's courts is more about
preventing the plaintiff from having its cake and eating it too, than about whether F2 is
truly an AAF. This distinction may appear meaningless, but it is not, as demonstrated
by the most compelling examples of "unfair" treatment in F2, namely cases ofpolitical
or social persecution of plaintiffs forced to return to a hostile F2. 251 Courts should
indeed be permitted to consider the plaintiff's own availment of F2's courts when
considering the plaintiff's argument that it would be unjust to force the plaintiff to
'
return to the "briar patch"252
of F2.
Aside from these limited circumstances, however, a party's previous availment of
F2's courts should not matter in the AAF analysis. "Given the highly fact specific
nature of the forum non conveniens inquiry, ''253 a plaintiff may have good reason to
consider F2 an AAF in one suit but not in another. For example, the causes of action in
the two suits may be different, even if arising from the same facts. 25 4 It is certainly
unreasonable to give weight in the AAF analysis to the defendant's previous availment
of F2's courts. Remarkably, some courts apparently have done so. In Abert Trading,
Inc. v.Kipling Belgium N.V/S.A.,25 the District Court of the Southern District of New
York considered the defendant's previous use of((proposed F2) Belgium's courts to file
suit against the plaintiff in a related dispute as relevant to the court's decision on the
availability of that forum.256 Although the court viewed the defendant's previous use of
F2's courts primarily as an indication that the defendant had submitted to F2's
jurisdiction, the court went on to cite the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a
broader proposition: "[T]he Second Circuit has affirmed dismissal on the grounds of

already have availed themselves of the Japanese courts ....
");
Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp.,
No. 04 Civ. 667 (NRB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82175, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (noting
prior litigation in Germany "alleging similar injuries"). Courts sometimes consider the
defendant's previous availment of the alternative forum. See, e.g., BBC Chartering & Logistic
GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Siemens Wind Power A/S, 546 F. Supp. 2d 437, 445 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
("The Court finds that Hamburg is an available and adequate forum for several reasons. As for
availability, the Hamburg court previously issued an order determining that it has jurisdiction
over the parallel lawsuit Defendant SWP filed against Plaintiffs in Hamburg on January 19,
2007.").
251. See, e.g., Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274-75 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (finding plaintiffs faced "ongoing danger" in the alternative forum); Aldana v. Fresh Del
Monte Produce, Inc., No. 01-3399-CIV-MORENO, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26777, at *6 (S.D.
Fla. June 4, 2003) ("The Plaintiffs have all alleged acts of torture committed against them and
were they to return, they might face great danger."); Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F.
Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[I]f the plaintiffs returned to Iran to prosecute this claim, they
would probably be shot."), afid, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
252. See JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, UNCLE REMUS: His SONGS AND His SAYINGS 62-64
(Penguin Books 1986) (1880).
253. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132
n.6 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
254. See, e.g., Haywin Textile Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Fin. Inv., 137 F. Supp. 2d 431,433,436
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (filing judgment enforcement action in alternative forum, but no proof
plaintiffs claims against U.S. firm holding debtor's property could be litigated in alternative
forum).
255. No. 00 Civ. 0478, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3109 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2002).
256. Abert Trading,Dist. LEXIS 3109 at *8-9.
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forum non conveniens where,2 57
as here, the defendant has already commenced suit in the
alternative (foreign) forum."
H. When Should the AAF Test Be Applied?
Because the test for an AAF proposed in this Article is comprehensive, applying it
will be time consuming for any court. 258 As suggested earlier, a court should be
expected to invest such time when the result of its ruling on the motion to dismiss will
have the effect of sending the case out of an American court that has (or, postSinochem, might have) jurisdiction over the case. Rather than setting such a case adrift
without due consideration to its potential destination, courts should be certain that a
case dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds might be brought in at least one
forum that the court deems to be an adequate alternative to the American court where
the plaintiff originally chose to file suit.
However, the court need not always conduct an in-depth inquiry into the availability
of an alternative forum. Such an inquiry is important when a case is going to be
dismissed, it is entirely unnecessary when a court intends to deny the motion and keep
the case in F 1 (the American forum). 259 The detailed six-factor inquiry laid out above
does not matter when a court will balance the private and public interest factors and
conclude that the forum non conveniens motion should be denied.
Therefore, the forum non conveniens inquiry should be further revised (in line with
the processes adopted by the Supreme Court in Sinochem and Ruhrgas) to minimize
any unnecessary burdens on courts and to require them to conduct an inquiry into an
AAF only where the court is inclined to grant the motion to dismiss. This proposal will
allow courts to use their best judgment to skip the AAF prong in cases where the
second prong of the original Gulf Oil test will prove easier to resolve and where the

257. Id. (citing Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc)) (emphasis added).
258. Indeed, in many cases courts may have to follow the lead of Senior District Court Judge
Charles Haight, Jr., in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., No. 00 Civ. 9812 (CSH), 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2253 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2002), who specifically called on the parties before
him to brief issues involving the availability of the alternative forum (Peru) before rendering his
decision on the defendant's forum non conveniens motion.
259. Some may be concerned that this concession to efficiency will blur the lines between
the two prongs of the forum non conveniens analysis, replicating some of the problems from
Piper.But this concern would be misplaced. So long as the two tests (AAF and balancing) are
clearly delineated, with the AAF considerations as set forth in the test proposed in this Article, a
court could look ahead to the balancing test without risk of ignoring or misapplying facts that
would be relevant to the AAF inquiry. So, if the facts of a given case are similar to the facts in
Piper,see supra PartII, that would be a clear case when the motion may or will be granted
based on the balancing of private and public interests, so the court should perform the AAF test.
By contrast, in a case where the court looks at the motion and sees that the private and public
factors will balance to keep the case in the United States, the courts do not need to engage inthe
intentionally comprehensive (and therefore demanding) AAF inquiry. See, e.g., Rowell v.
Franconia Minerals Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036-38 (N.D. I11.2008) (holding that
balance of private and public factors favored Illinois forum; Canadian plaintiff resided in
Illinois, executed consultant agreement with Canadian defendant and performed work in
Illinois).
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conclusion will be to retain the case in any event. 26 However, where the court will or
may reach the opposite result in the second prong of its analysis, it should conduct the
full-blown AAF inquiry proposed in this Article.
Also, as has occurred on occasion, courts can rely on AAF inquiries made by other
courts to assist them in conducting their own AAF inquiry (at least where the
conditions in F2 are largely the same and the claim in the present case is not different
in any relevant, material way from the earlier one).26'
CONCLUSION

The long-standing analysis for forum non conveniens in federal court has two
prongs: the availability of an alternative forum and a balancing of private and public
interests. Both must be clearly defined and given due weight. The current systemwhich views the test for an AAF as a pro forma test and places ultimate emphasis on
the weighing of private and public interests-is broken. Moreover, courts do not apply
uniform inquiries into the existence of an AAF. In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Sinochem, which will encourage defendants to seek dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds more often and at an earlier stage of litigation, the first prong of
the forum non conveniens analysis must be reconceived.
The test proposed in this Article offers a comprehensive checklist of items for
courts to consider in analyzing whether an alternative forum truly exists. As proposed
here, a court need not engage in the AAF test where it intends to deny the motion on
the basis of the second prong of the forum non conveniens analysis.
However, where a court is inclined to grant the forum non conveniens motion and
dismiss the case, it should engage in a thorough analysis of the availability of the
alternative forum. The six-factor test proposed here creates a checklist for courts to use
in determining whether F2 is truly available to the plaintiff(s) in this case for this (or
these) cause(s) of action. Each factor has several considerations. While some
considerations and, even more so, some factors may ultimately determine the
availability (or lack thereof) of an alternative forum, most of the considerations
proposed in this Article are meant to allow courts to think about the larger picture. If a
court determines that any one factor is not met, then F2 should be deemed unavailable,
thus foreclosing dismissal of the case.
In an age of global interdependence, easy transport, and easy communication,
American courts must uphold the principle so gracefully described more than thirty
years ago by the Supreme Court in the context of forum-selection clauses. A decade
before its decision in Piper v. Reyno, in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Court
wrote that "[f]or at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas
commercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The barrier of
distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest territory no longer

260. For courts to take this action, the Supreme Court will need to act to soften the dictates
of Piper by adopting the reasoning set forth most recently in Sinochem. See supraPart II.
261. See, e.g., Robert v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. 3-01-CV-1576-L, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7232 at *10 (N.D. Tex. April 23, 2002) ("[O]ther federal courts have recognized that
[proposed F2] Ontario provides adequate legal redress for injuries caused by defective
products.").
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does so." 262 Those same arguments that mitigated in favor of American courts ceding
control over cases to a foreign jurisdiction when parties had consented to another
jurisdiction in a forum-selection clause should be remembered today when considering
whether a foreign forum is available to hear an action that has been filed in the United
States.
The revised forum non conveniens test proposed in this Article might lead courts to
think about how forum non conveniens is being used, how it should be used, and
whether a different test might better facilitate the proper use of forum non
conveniens. 263 Piper has led courts to interpret the two-part inquiry as they see fit
without strict rules or guidelines. 264 There is a real concern that the current doctrine is
driven by what is best for defendants (and particularly American defendants) 265 rather
than by the policy goals of (a) protecting the domestic courts and the public they
serve 266 and (b) ensuring that wrongdoers are held accountable for their actions in
forums where jurisdiction over them is proper. 267 A clearer and more easily reviewable
test for forum non conveniens will ensure greater transparency and accountability for
courts inclined to dismiss cases on the basis of forum non conveniens.268

262. 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972), supersededby statute,Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006)).
263. Following the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Sinochem International Co. v.
MalaysiaInternationalShipping Co., 549 U.S. 422 (2007), forum non conveniens decisions are

more likely than ever to be made at an early stage of the proceedings, thus expanding the power
(and responsibility) of federal courts to dismiss cases, even where jurisdiction is (or may be)
proper.
264. See Robertson & Speck, supra note 1, at 970 (noting that "[s]everal scholars have
recently demonstrated that the application of the federal forum non conveniens doctrine yields 'a
crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent decisions."' (quoting Allan R. Stein, Forum
Non Conveniens and the Redundancy ofCourt-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 785
(1985)).
265. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,63 TUL. L.
REv. 553, 563 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has led to 'reverse
forum-shopping' of which numerous products liability defendants have since availed themselves
successfully," and, as a result, "foreign victims... no longer enjoy the measure of protection
from shoddy products to which United States residents are accustomed" (quoting Piper Aircraft
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.19 (1981))).
266. See id. at 555-56 (noting that forum non conveniens was adopted as "a more broadly
gauged anti-forum-shopping device" that led to the "emergence of a principle designed to
counteract jurisdictional exorbitance and to foil the schemes of those who 'seek not simply
justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment' (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006))).
267. Notably, in GulfOil, the Supreme Court explicitly discussed the concerns it hoped to
address in setting forth a federal doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Court reasoned that,
while venue statutes are written to give plaintiffs broad latitude to decide where to file their
lawsuits, "the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps justice
blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy
of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to
himself." Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507.
268. The Article proposes to reconceive the test for an AAF in the forum non conveniens
inquiry to repair the problems created by Piper and to protect against overuse and abuse of
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As a secondary goal, this Article hopes to provoke Congress to act, even if the
action that Congress takes is ultimately even more extreme than the positions courts
have taken. 269 More than sixty years ago, Congress evinced its ability and willingness
to legislate in this area when, within a year of the Supreme Court's decision in Gulf'Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert,27 ° Congress legislated the transfer of cases, effectively overriding
GulfOil with regard to cases involving purely domestic parties.27' In an ideal world, in
spite of its recent lack of success in the area of civil procedure reform, Congress would
step in again to legislate these issues.272
If Congress wants to limit access to American courts for foreign parties in tort or
other particular types of cases, it can do so legislatively-as it has done in the past. The
courts should not be using their powers to make those kinds of policy choices. Nor
should forum non conveniens be used as a device for defendants to engage in the very
type of forum shopping that foreign plaintiffs often are accused of engaging in when
they bring lawsuits in the United States.

forum non conveniens; forum-shopping by defendants; policy making by courts in an area
where Congress has demonstrated its ability and willingness to legislate; some American
multinational corporations escaping liability for their wrongdoings; and courts using forum non
conveniens to avoid expending resources on "tough" cases that might be properly before them
jurisdictionally.
269. As Justice Black presciently pointed out in his dissent in Gulf Oil,
The convenience which the individual defendant will enjoy from the Court's new
rule offorum non conveniens in law actions may be thought to justify its inherent
delays, uncertainties, administrative complications and hardships. But in any
event, Congress has not yet said so; and I do not think that this Court should, 150
years after the passage of the Judiciary Act, fill in what it thinks is a deficiency in
the deliberate policy which Congress adopted. Whether the doctrine offorum non
conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for Congress to adopt it.
330 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
270. 330 U.S. 501.
271. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (2006). Those statutes eliminated the use of forum non
conveniens for federal court cases involving purely domestic parties (except where the
alternative forum was a state court), leaving the judicial doctrine to cope primarily with cases
involving foreign parties as either plaintiffs or defendants (or both). Just to be clear, the federal
transfer statutes do not apply only to domestic parties; foreign parties can be involved in cases
that are transferred under §§ 1404 and 1406. However, those statutes render forum non
conveniens meaningless as a doctrine where domestic parties are concerned (unless a case is
being sent to state court), whereas in addition to the possibility of transfer, cases with a foreign
plaintiff or defendant are still subject to dismissal for forum non conveniens in lieu of or in
addition to any federal court transfer that may occur.
272. As the Justice Black dissent in Gulf Oil noted,
[n]o matter how little dispute there is as to the desirability of such legislation,
there is comparatively little chance of overcoming legislative inertia and securing
its passage unless some accident happens to focus attention upon it. The best hope
is that the courts will feel free to take appropriate action without specific
legislation authorizing them to do so.
330 U.S. at 517 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Roger S. Foster, Placeof Trial-Interstate
Application of IntrastateMethods ofAdjustment, 44 HARV. L. REv. 41, 52 (1930)).

